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By the end of 2009 a lot had already been talked about ARM prospects for the future and its 
sustainability. Several rumors surfaced that the company could be one of the intervenients in 
the most interesting deal of the last years among IT companies. Among others, Intel was 
pointed as the most obvious candidate for the acquisition, however Intel had the company of 
Google, Apple and Samsung, just to name a few. 
In this thesis we analyzed the hypothesis of a deal between Intel and ARM, what value 
would be created for Intel and ARM shareholders, and how much competition would 
Intel face in the case it decided to move forward. 
We concluded that the deal is feasible and would create value for Intel and ARM 
shareholders, at the expense of the current ARM customers and, most likely, final 
consumers. 
There seems to be no other firm with capabilities and reasons to go for such deal, and 
Intel would face no competition, offering a premium of 55% over ARM market value. 
This would leave value for Intel as we calculated the synergy at 73% the actual ARM 
market value. 
Finally as a separated note, it should be kept in mind that such a deal would probably face a 
tough time being approved by regulators, such is already the dominant position Intel has in the 
market. 
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 Following stressful years, in the beginning of the century with the threat posed by AMD, Intel 
has managed to get clear of their competitors and enjoy a clear dominance in the 
microprocessors market. From 2003 until now, Intel has only known success and increasing 
revenues and profits. However this dominance seems, at least, shadowed in the next few 
years. 
With the increasing number of smartphones and mobile platforms, a new company emerged 
as the future of mobile and light computation: ARM. Although barely recognized by the 
general consumer, ARM designs, are the most sold nowadays. Every, but every smartphone 
carries an ARM microprocessor, whether it is manufactured by Apple, Samsung, Nokia or 
someone else. ARM does not actually produce any hardware, it just develop the architecture, 
leaving manufacturing for other companies. 
In the last few years ARM has just consolidated its market position, dominating virtually 100% 
of the Smartphone’s market in the world. However with the new Windows 8 (compatible with 
ARM architecture) it seems the actual equilibrium may be in cause. 
In the next chapters we analyze the possibility of a deal, with Intel buying ARM. In first place 
we review the academic literature regarding mergers and acquisitions and valuations, then we 
present company and market analyzes and after that we move to the valuation of the 
companies. In the end we evaluate the firm that would emerge in the case of a deal a finally 
we propose the deal itself.  
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2. Literature Review 
The final purpose of this Master Thesis is to evaluate the possibility of a deal between Intel and 
ARM. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are a usual tool for firms trying to deliver value for 
shareholders, however final results can vary a lot between deals, from the ones with very good 
results to the ones that destroyed a lot of value. 
The focus will be on the strategy behind the deal and on the structure of the deal itself, trying 
to understand how value can be created and shared among the shareholders of both 
companies. This creation of value can be achieved in two ways: through synergies or through 
improvements in the management of the target company. 
Solid knowledge in various financial topics are needed to undertake such task and these topics 
will be divided in two main areas: valuation techniques and other M&A issues. 
2.1. Valuation Approaches 
Valuation is a vital piece of any M&A. It is essential to estimate correctly the value of an asset if 
anyone wants next to create value with it. A misevaluation is a simple way to throw away 
shareholders money in an acquisition. 
There are several types of valuation techniques but I will concentrate on the most common 
two of them: Discounted Cash-Flow techniques and the Multiples approach. Multiples’ 
approaches are widely used by investment bankers and dealmakers, however most business 
schools teach their students DCF techniques (Kaplan and Ruback, 1996). Goedhart, Koller and 
Wessels (2005) point the merit of multiples analyses but they also concede that DCF are the 
“most accurate and flexible” methods for valuing projects. However, sometimes, more 
important than the use of advanced financial models, is the use of plausible assumptions in the 
valuation process (Sirower and Sahni, 2006). 
2.1.1. Cash-Flow Approaches 
DCF calculates the value of an asset as the present value of the expected future cash flows 
from that asset. Several types of DCF models exist but they should yield the same results if one 
is consistent with the assumptions. As Luehrman (1997) refers, present value is a function of 
cash-flows and their timing and riskiness. Some models calculate the value of equity only – 
FCFE – some others calculate the value of the entire asset, including debt – FCFF and APV.  
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2.1.1.1. Estimating Cash Flows 
Firm value is derived from cash and not from earnings as some may think. How to calculate 
these cash flows is of the upmost importance for any valuation since any error in the 
estimation of this component will result in mistakes in final valuation (Goedhart et al. 2005) 
Types of Cash Flow 
The cash flows used depend on the model used. Damodaran (2006) presents a wide variety of 
DCF models and among others the following cash flows can be used: 
1. Dividends per share (DPS) can be used to calculate the equity value of the firm using a 
dividend discount model (DDM), however according Damodaran (2006), since the 
1990s that companies started to distribute cash to shareholders in the form of stock 
buybacks and so this model can undervalue firms that use this method of distribute 
cash. 
2. Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) deals with the problems of the of a DDM  given that it 
assumes that all the cash the is left in the firm after reinvestment needs and debt 
payments is returned to shareholders. This model assumes that a strong corporate 
governance system is in place. 
3. Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) is an alternative cash flow that can be used in a 
WACC based DCF valuation or in an APV valuation. FCFF reflects the firm cash flow 
after taxes and reinvestment decisions but it does not reflect any debt and interest 
payments. 
Cross Border Cash-Flows 
In our case we will have a British company – ARM – bought by an American company – Intel. 
As the currencies differ we will need to use some tools to adjust the Pound Sterling value of 
ARM to US Dollars. These tools will solve problems related to different real interest rates and 
inflation expectations and also differences in tax systems among countries. 
Regarding the estimation of cash flows, it can be done both in the home or the local currency. 
In our case both solutions are easy to adopt as spot and forward exchange rates are easily 
available for the USD/GBP. Froot and Kester (1995) refer that both methods should yield 
similar results as long as the assumptions are consistent in both cases: 
In the case of the estimates being done in GBP, which is our local currency for ARM, the local 
cost of capital should be used to discount them to the present. In the end the NPV in GBP is 
converted to USD at the spot rate yielding the firm NPV in Intel home currency. 
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The other option would be to convert each cash flow at the correspondent forward exchange 
rate and then discount them, at the domestic cost of capital. In the case Forward rates are not 
available interest rate parity can also be used (Zenner, Matthews, Marks and Mago, 2008). 
Other question is whether one should use remitted cash flows or earned cash flows. Froot and 
Kester (1995) argue that to decide on that we should look at the countries involved. In our 
case, we are facing a company established in the UK, so the recommendation is to use earned 
cash flows, because even if they are not immediately distributed they should earn an adequate 
rate of return and so increase the value of the company. 
Each situation has different tax treatments but Froot and Kester (1995) recommend the use of 
the higher of the marginal tax rates paid by companies as a valid assumption. 
2.1.1.2. Terminal Value 
As time goes by it gets harder and harder to continue estimating cash flows in a reliable way. 
From a certain point on it is advised to assume that cash flows will grow at a certain growth 
rate. Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) call it terminal value and give it a great deal of 
attention given the high percentage of firm value that is dependent on it. As we can see in 
figure 1 we should be especially careful in the analyses of the ARM terminal values given that 
for the hi-tech industry the terminal values can represent up to 125% of the value of the firm. 
Figure 1: Industry terminal values (Copeland et al. 2000) 
 
5  M&A: ARM takeover by Intel 
  
 
However in our case this should not happen given that ARM, despite its growth opportunities, 
is an already mature company with positive net cash-flows. 
Generally terminal values are calculated as a perpetuity, discounting the first cash flow after 
the explicit period at a discount rate that is the difference between the cost of capital and the 
expected growth rate of the cash flow used.  
It is important to notice that when estimating the cash flow used to calculate the terminal 
value, the value of the CAPEX must be at least equal to depreciation, otherwise the firm would 
have no capital to operate in the long run (Kaplan and Ruback, 1996). Another important point 
is the fact that it is difficult, even more when considering great companies, to keep growth 
rates above those of the economy for a long period of time, what means that the growth 
considered in the terminal value should be no higher than the economy expected growth rate 
(Damodaran, 2008). Other important aspect stressed by Damodaran (2008) is that return on 
new invested capital is often below the cost of capital which leads to destruction of value 
through growth. 
2.1.1.3 The Discount Rate 
The discount rate should represent the opportunity cost of funds invested. This opportunity 
cost is the return an investor could expect to receive if he invested his money in an asset with 
similar risk (Froot and Kester, 1995). Opportunity cost can also be seen as a risk premium 
added to a risk free rate (Luehrman, 1997). 
Different discount rates should be used depending on the DCF technique we are using: 
Table 1: DCF techniques and discount rates 
  
DDM WACC DCF APV 
Type of Cash Flow EPS or FCFE FCFF FCFF 
Discount Rate Cost of Levered Equity 
Cost of Capital (Cost of 
levered equity and cost of 
debt) 
Cost of unlevered Equity and 
cost of debt 
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2.1.1.4. Cost of Equity 
Table 2: Equity risk premium models (Damodaran, 2010) 
 Model Equity Risk Premium 
The CAPM 
Expected Return = Riskfree Rate + 
BetaAsset (Equity Risk Premium) 
Risk Premium for investing in the 
market portfolio, which includes all 
risky assets, relative to the riskless 
rate. 
Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM) 
 
Risk Premiums for individual 
(unspecified) market risk factors. 
Multi-Factor Model 
 
Risk Premiums for individual 
(specified) market risk factors. 
Proxy Models 
Expected Return = a+b (Proxy 1) +c 
(Proxy 2) (where the proxies are 
firm characteristics such as market 
capitalization, price to book ratios 
or return momentum) 
No explicit risk premium 
computation, but coefficients on 
proxies reflect risk preferences. 
 
As we can see in table 2 there are several models for estimating equity risk premiums. We will 
focus our attention on the first one: the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The model 
presented first by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is the most widely used in Finance.  
The CAPM will use three components to calculate a return on equity (re): a risk free rate (rf), a 
market risk premium (rm-rf) and a β. This will result in the following model: 
 
The model is based on the assumption that an investor can be diversified in the market and 
that what is really important is the market risk the investor bears and not the specific company 
risk. This way the β will be a measure of the market exposure that an investor can get through 
certain asset, and thus the investor should be compensated by such exposure to the market. 
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2.1.1.5. The Risk Free Rate 
The risk free rate is the building block for estimating both the cost of equity and the cost of 
capital. The risk free rate is the return that an investment delivers in any scenario, no matter 
what the return on this investment will be uncorrelated with other risky investments. This 
means that the return will have no variance around the expected return and that the final 
return will be equal to the expected return. 
There are two basic conditions for an investment to be risk free (Damodaran, 2008): 
1. There can be no default risk, which means that only government securities can be seen 
as risk free because governments control the printing of currency which means that 
they can at least guarantee the payment of the nominal amount promised. Some 
caution however must be used when stating that government securities are default 
free because it can be the case that governments refuse to honor their obligations, or 
in some cases governments issue debt in different currencies that their own, which 
means that they have no control over the printing of that currency. 
2. More subtle is the requirement that there can be no reinvestment risk in the 
investment for this to be risk free. A bond that pay a fixed amount every six months 
during five years can be default free, but the fact that one cannot know the interest 
that the intermediate coupons will earn after being received. A good solution to 
overcome this problem is to use a zero coupon bond, which only pays the totality of its 
value in the end of the five year period, giving us an explicit risk free rate for that five 
year period. This means that risk free rates for different periods must be taken from 
bonds with different maturities. 
Since risk free rates vary depending on time horizons and the cash flows we are discounting 
come from different periods, Damodaran (2008) suggests the use of an average duration of 
cash flows (a weighted average of the cash flows and the time remaining for their existence) to 
calculate the duration of the risk free security used as the risk free asset. 
Copeland et al. (2000) suggest the use of a ten year bond rate as the risk free rate. In our case, 
the US treasury bond will be used as the risk free rate for the home cash flows and the British 
government bond will be used as the risk free rate for the foreign cash flows. 
8  M&A: ARM takeover by Intel 
  
 
2.1.1.6. The market risk premium 
The market risk premium is the difference between the return on the market and the return 
on the risk free investment (rm-rf). Several ways can be used to estimate risk premiums, 
Damodaran (2010) points three ways to proceed with this estimation: 
1. Survey Premiums – Going directly to investors and ask them about the expected return 
they require to invest in the market. Despite the increasing number of surveys 
available few analysts use this method to evaluate risk premiums. Among other 
reasons for not using this method, Fisher and Statman (2000) found that the relation 
between this surveys and the real risk premiums has the wrong sign. 
2. Historical Risk Premiums – This is the most widely used approach to estimate risk 
premiums. Three factors must be taken into account when calculating risk premiums. 
The first is the time period to use. Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2005) suggest the use of 
a long time series to calculate the risk premium in order to achieve a more accurate 
estimation.  The risk free rate used and the market index used also play a part on the 
final results that. A broadest market index should be used and the index should be 
market-weighted and free of survivor bias. Finally the averaging can be arithmetic or 
geometric but if we accept that returns are uncorrelated over time Damodaran (2010) 
says that the arithmetic average is the better and most unbiased estimate of the risk 
premium. 
3. Implied Equity Premiums – Implied risk premiums in current dividend yields or risk 
premiums implied by Option Pricing Models could be used and, if we consider that 
they are forward looking instead of historical and mean reverting premiums, are very 
appealing, however the disagreement over their predictive power make this option 
less used. 
2.1.1.7. The Beta (β) 
To complete the model, we will use a relative measure of the systematic risk the company is 
exposed to. The value is standardized around one and a value bigger than one would mean 
that the company amplifies the market fluctuations. The β is a measure of the covariance of 
the returns of an asset with the returns of a market portfolio, divided by the variance of the 
market portfolio (Kothari and Shanken, 2002) and Damodaran (2002) refers that the usual 
procedure to the estimation is to regress the returns of the asset against the returns on a 
market index, if possible a market index that is market-weighted and with the largest possible 
number of securities, however Fama and French (1996) pointed that good proxies for this 
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market portfolio were yet to find and that could be the reason why βs were not enough to 
explain expected return. The time period to use in the regression should be reasonable, with a 
minimum of three years but preferentially five or ten years. One must be careful when 
calculating betas to understand if in the last years the company suffered important changes 
that would change the landscape of the firm and this way the beta of the firm. Copeland et al. 
(2000) suggest the estimation of industry betas to provide information about the reasonability 
of our company beta. The author also suggests the de-leverage of the betas in order to 
estimate the industry average beta and the re-leverage of the beta only in the end of the 
process. Another advanced hypothesis is the use of unlevered industry betas publicly available. 
The relation of levered and unlevered betas is given by the following expression: 
 
2.1.1.8. Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt is composed by a premium on top of the risk free rate. If we assume that the 
projects we are valuing are of the same risk as the company, a good estimate for the cost of 
debt are the observed market rates of return on the firm’s debt securities (Miles and Ezzel, 
1980), Froot and Kester (1995) also agree with the use of market rates of return on the firm’s 
debt securities as long as the firm’s debt is “nearly riskless”. Another reasonable approach is to 
use rating agencies’ bond ratings to sum up a spread on top of the risk free rate. 
2.1.2. APV vs. WACC 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and Adjusted Present Value (APV) are the most 
common DCF methods used. They differ on discount rates used and on how they treat tax 
shields. 
The WACC model discounts the cash flows to the firm as if the firm had no debt or tax shield 
from interest payments. According to Damodaran (2006) the tax benefits and the bankruptcy 
costs are implicit in the model through the discount rate: 
 
The equity and debt values used should be the market values. 
APV in the other end does not capture the effects of the tax shields and bankruptcy costs on 
the discount rate. Introduced by Myers (1974), this model sum up two pieces, to get to the 
company value: the first piece is the FCFF discounted at the unlevered cost of equity (the cost 
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of equity that would exist if the firm had no debt), and then adds the value of tax savings that 
arise from the use of debt. This model is used to isolate and understand the effect of taxes in 
valuation (Copeland et al. 2000). Tax savings are calculated in the following way: 
 
There are different approaches regarding the rate used to discount the tax benefits, Kaplan 
and Ruback (1995) used a version they named Compressed Adjusted Present Value where they 
discount the tax benefits at the unlevered cost of equity, arguing that debt was proportional to 
firm value and so the tax shields were so risky as the firm itself, while Luehrman (1997) and 
Cooper and Nyborg (2006) prefer to use the cost of debt to discount back the tax benefits, 
claiming that companies will almost always be capable of paying interest, but sometimes they 
will not enjoy the benefits of the tax shields. The APV model also requires the estimation of 
the cost of Bankruptcy, but as Warner (1977) argues that the costs of bankruptcy from 
increased leverage are low, and in the case of our companies the levels of debt are really low, 
we will not focus on this question. 
Both models have adherents with Luehrman (1997) stating that the APV is a better model 
because its more flexible than the WACC, less prone to errors and gives much more output 
than the WACC. By the other side Damodaran (2006) points that the major problem with the 
APV is that dealing with bankruptcy costs is often difficult when using the model. 
To reach equity values both models need to subtract the debt value from the value of the firm. 
2.1.3. Relative Valuation – Multiples 
 Multiples are usually ratios that link firm or equity values to performance indicators. As long 
as firms have a peer group or an industry to be compared against, multiples is a valid way to 
go. 
Multiples can take several forms: Price/Earnings, Price /Book Equity, Price/Sales, EV/EBITDA, 
EV/Sales. Any performance measure that seems adequate to infer the value on that relative 
industry is valid, and specific measures are more suited to specific industries. 
Kaplan and Ruback (1996) find evidence that DCF methods explain better market prices but 
they stress that when used together, “comparable-based estimates added explanatory power 
to the DCF-based estimates”. Goedhart et al. (2005) refer that multiples are a good way to 
stress-test the cash-flow valuations done previously. Moreover multiples are forward looking 
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because they are based on market expectations and in the presence of possible transactions 
they already include the premiums. 
EBITDA based multiples yield the best results on the sample studied by Kaplan and Ruback 
(1996) and Enterprise Value/EBITDA is one of the most widely used multiple in practice, 
according to Fernandez (2001).  
According to Goedhart et al. (2005) there are some rules to create the right multiple. The 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) should be similar among firms and the same should happen 
with their growth prospects. The multiples used should be forward looking: the inclusion of 
expected profits would be the better but if reliable forecasts are not available then it is 
imperative to use the latest possible data. The use of enterprise value multiples is also 
advisable because they are not so reactive to the firm financial structure, when comparing 
with price/earnings ratios for instance. Finally one must adapt the result for nonoperating 
items as excess cash in the firm. 
2.2. M&A Issues 
For an acquisition to make sense, the total value creation (synergy) from the deal should be 
positive (Eckbo, 2009) and this is usually the case. However the acquirer will only increase its 
value if it can achieve performance improvements that are greater than the premium paid 
(Dobbs, Huyett and Koller, 2010). There are several possible outcomes in an acquisition 
attempt: the acquirer may fail to take control of the target, it may lose it to an offer from a 
rival company or it can be successful. The strategy and the rationale behind the deal, the fit 
between the companies and even the bidding strategy used by the acquirer play an important 
defining the final outcome. In this section we will focus on the main M&A issues. Initially we 
will focus on the different possible types of M&A deals, then there will be a section on the 
value creation (synergy) that arises from the deal, a third section will be dedicated to how this 
synergy is shared between the target’s and the acquirer’s shareholders and in the last section 
we will address the deal structure. 
2.2.1. Types of M&A 
For different reasons, acquisitions do not take always the same format. Damodaran (2002) 
divides them into different categories, depending on the buyer and on the method of 
execution: 
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The acquisition can take the form of a merger. When this is the case the acquired firm 
becomes part of the acquiring firm. For this to happen shareholders of both firms must 
agree with the merger. 
Another possible form is a consolidation. In this case a new firm is created and the 
shareholders of both the acquirer and the target receive shares of the new firm. 
Tender offer is traditionally used for hostile takeovers. One case where this is usual is 
when firms find an underperforming target and try to redirect their operations into a 
more profitable direction (Bruner, 2004). In this procedure the acquiring company 
bypasses the board of the target and goes directly to its shareholders with an offer. If 
the acquiring firm is successful in acquiring the totality of the stocks the target ceases 
is absorbed by the acquirer and a merger happens, otherwise the target firm continues 
to exist. 
There is also the possibility of buying only part of a firm. This can be done through a 
purchase of assets. Despite the firm is not being sold, there is the need for the 
shareholders of the target firm to vote the deal. 
There is also the possibility of the company be bought by its own management or a group of 
investors. These deals take the form of MBO’s when the management buys the firm and LBO’s 
when the operation is largely financed by debt. In both cases the firm ceases to be publicly 
traded and becomes a private firm. This will not be the case however and we will not focus our 
attention in these two cases. 
2.2.2. Value Creation 
The value creation in any acquisition depends on the magnitude of the gains achieved by the 
new entity born from the deal. The literature refers mainly two types of gains that can be 
made: Sirower and Sahni (2006) refer to synergy as a key factor for the success of an 
acquisition, stating that, when a company fails to achieve it, acquiring shareholders lose 
money due to the premium paid. Another source of value referred by the literature is the 
existence of inefficiencies in the target company. Kini, Kracaw and Mian (1994) and Wruck 
(2008) even refer the market of corporate takeovers as a mean to discipline managerial boards 
and forcing them to achieve higher shareholder return. While the criteria for overall value 
creation stated above is usually met, this does not mean that the acquirer company always 
make money. For the acquirer to create value a stricter restriction must be met and the 
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acquirer must achieve performance improvements that are greater than the premium paid 
(Dobbs, Huyett and Koller, 2010). 
2.2.3. Synergies 
Damodaran (2005) provides a very good framework for synergy analyses. He divides synergy 
into two general categories and then divides these two categories into several sub-divisions. 
The broader general categories are operating synergies and financial synergies. While 
financial synergies can take the form of higher cash-flows or lower discount rates, operating 
synergies only appear as increased cash-flows. Operating synergies are sub-divided into four 
categories: 
Economies of scale, which usually arises in horizontal mergers and come from the fact 
that average costs should go down with dimension. 
Increased market power. As the first, this synergy is more likely to occur in horizontal 
mergers and occurs because of the higher market share. This leads to higher profit 
margins and consequently to higher cash-flows. 
Combination of different functional strengths. This is a very general synergy that can 
be applied to any merger. 
Higher growth in existing markets and presence in new markets. As the previous one, 
this synergy is very general and can be applied in any kind of merger. A good example 
of this kind of synergy is the acquisition of established companies in developing 
economies by companies of developed economies to rapidly enter the market. 
Financial Synergies can also take several forms: 
The combination of a firm with high return investment opportunities and no cash 
available and a firm with vast cash piles and no investment opportunities is a very 
appealing reason for a merger. 
Increased debt capacity, potentiated by the decreased variance in the combined firms 
profits. With higher stability the combined firm should be able to borrow more than 
the two companies individually. 
Tax benefits. When firms can take advantage from the merger to reduce the amount 
of taxes paid. This can be achieved by either acquiring a loss making firm or by being 
able to increase the depreciation charges with assets bought. 
The last reason is diversification, however this is not a consensual reason for a merger 
in the literature. 
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2.2.4. Inefficiencies on the target company 
The other way to create value is through the acquisition of underperforming companies. 
Wruck (2008) points the case of managers of publicly traded companies with little equity 
incentives: “focused mainly on growth and diversification, often at the expense of profitability 
and value”. This kind of companies can be a good target for acquisitions, and then for 
restructuring. Shivdasani and Zak (2007) point some measures to take when restructuring 
public companies: their greater focus goes to increasing leverage, as a way to concentrate 
ownership and tightening the financial discipline of the board; divestitures of the non-core 
assets, going against those who point business diversification as a synergy and focus on cash-
flow and cash distributions. Adding to that, Wruck (2008) also advises companies to change 
the incentives of boards, specifically giving equity related ownership to management. The 
adoption of new performance measures and the decentralization of decision making are also 
referred.  
Despite the superior financial performance of private equity firms, the implementation of 
these measures does not come without costs. Cost of equity does no longer benefit from the 
risk-bearing economies provided by the capital markets. This creates an incentive for a return 
to public equity markets, however, companies that return to public ownership do not 
completely let go the private equity governing rules. 
2.2.5. Method of Payment 
Acquisitions are usually paid using cash, stocks or a mixed form of both. Additionally tailored 
agreements (“earnout” contracts) can be made (Zenner et al. 2008). This contracts link a future 
payment to the performance of the bought asset, with a higher performance resulting in a 
higher payment. Bruner (2004) refers other risk managing device, the use of collars, a contract 
that changes a future payout, if the stock of the buyer falls or rises above a certain level. These 
hypothesis for financing the transaction will lead to a decision that depends on several factors 
as the type of deal proposed, the type of firm being bought or the risk involved in the deal.  
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) present a framework with the reasons for the different 
payments. When there is asymmetric information regarding the target firm and the valuation 
cannot be made precisely, acquirers prefer to use equity as payment, sharing the risk of future 
devaluations with the target’s shareholders. The bigger the value at risk (VAR – premium 
paid/market value of the acquirer) the greater the incentive for paying with equity (Sirower 
and Sahni, 2006). Overvalued stock or credit constraints are also an incentive for using equity 
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as payment, the same happening with taxes, where cash is immediately taxed and equity may 
be kept and taxed only later.  By the other side when the payment in equity may cause 
changes on firm control, firms tend to use more cash and less equity to finance the deal. In the 
case of cross-border acquisitions, cash is also preferable because target’s shareholders may 
not have access to information about the acquirer and consequently they will not be available 
to accept shares as payment. Tender offers are other case where cash is more used than 
equity increasing the probability of success of the bid and finally, cash is also commonly used 
when buying unlisted targets due to the fact that their shareholders usually sell with the 
objective of cash out. 
2.2.6. Value Sharing Between Shareholders 
Corporate Takeovers deal with a huge amount of money and they usually create value, 
through synergies or better use of assets. However it is important to understand how the gains 
from the deal are shared between the two companies’ shareholders. The three main findings 
in research point that target shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns from all 
acquisitions, while acquirer’s shareholders end up with small or no abnormal returns from 
tender offers and negative abnormal returns from mergers (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
Damodaran (2005) highlights the fact that, while in theory the division of value should be 
made according to the contribution each company would give to the creation of value, what 
happens in practice is that target’s shareholders make much more money on average than 
acquirer’s shareholders. This may be linked with the fact that target companies can create a 
process where interested companies bid for the target, creating competition among them. 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) argue that a better initial preparation and presentation is critical for 
better performance from acquirers, given that, most of the times the negative initial reaction 
from the market is persistent overtime. They attribute this lack of preparation, in some degree, 
to excessive self-confidence and consequently to a biased evaluation of the target so that the 
deal is done. Bruner (2004) adds that in a specific type of deal, the “merger of equals”, the 
evidence is even most striking, with the returns being much smaller than in the other kind of 
deals, and argues that in these deals target’s managers forget value creation in order to have 
more influence in the outcome or a better position in the new firm. 
The mode of acquisition and payment also play a role on the profitability of the deal. Loughran 
and Vijh (1997) find that cash tender offers create superior returns for the acquirers, while 
stock mergers have significant lower returns. The replacement of the inefficient management 
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is one of the reasons for the success of cash tender offers. Additionally when acquisitions are 
paid in cash, markets are surer about the virtues of the deal, while when they are paid with 
equity markets become suspicious of overvalued equity and the quality of the deal proposed. 
Bruner (2004) also points these facts and add some points to this analysis. Credible synergies, 
mainly cost synergies are better accepted by the market, creating positive reactions, while 
revenue synergies may be viewed as more risky. Buying during cold M&A markets also pays 
better than during hot ones. Finally companies which maintain the focus on the core business 
achieve better results than companies who try business diversification. 
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3. Industry and Company Analysis 
3.1. Industry Analysis 
Semiconductors play a crucial role in today’s life and have changed society in uncountable 
ways, during the last forty years. Nowadays semiconductors are present in an incredible large 
number of devices people use every day, from dishwashers to machine tools, passing through 
computers and mobile phones. The internet world we know and the last decades innovations 
would not be possible without the rapid expansion the semiconductors’ industry experienced. 
Even today, the Moore’s Law, dated from late 60’s, is still valid and the number of transistors 
that can be placed on a standard processor continues to double every 18 to 24 months. This 
rule from Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, helps to explain the incredibly fast rhythm of 
change and innovation in this industry. 
Within the industry it is possible to identify five main business models: 
1. Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDM) – This is the business model where Intel 
Corporation (from now on referred to as Intel) fits in. The companies organized as IDM 
operate along the entire value chain of the semiconductor industry, including the 
design and manufacturing of the components. As they operate along the entire 
production process, these companies are also the responsible for the major part of the 
market revenue. 
2. Fabless – These companies do not own their own production facilities. They design the 
semiconductors and pay other companies to manufacture them. These firms control 
the sale of the final products. The advantage of this model is to avoid the costs 
incurred with the construction of the production facilities and also the fixed costs of 
these factories. 
3. Licensing or Intellectual Property (IP) – These companies design the products and 
license them to another companies interested in using the design. There are no sales 
operations and all the final distribution is done by the companies that buy the designs. 
ARM operates under this method, licensing their designs to another companies, who 
manufacture and sell them. As a result of only operate in a small part of the 
production process, the sales volume from IP companies is a small part of the overall 
market. 
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Figure 3: Market size by components 














4. Foundries – These companies do not design their own products. Instead they operate 
modern production facilities and manufacture semiconductors for other market 
participants as fabless companies. The success of these companies highly depends on 
the capacity to keep high levels of capacity utilization in large factories. 
5. Back-end Processes (Assembly and Testing) – The specialization in the industry and 
the increased globalization as led to the creation of companies specialized only in 
testing and packaging of components. Due to the lower automation of these services, 
these companies are mostly based in South-East Asia, particularly in Taiwan, Singapore 
and Malaysia, due to low labor costs. 
3.1.1. Market Size and Structure 
The market has some large players with market power in the specific segment they operate, as 
the case of Intel, which largely dominates the picture in the data processing segment, 
producing mainly microprocessors and the respective chipsets. However no firm has a 
dominant position in the entire semiconductor market. Intel is the largest firm in the sector, 
with a market share of approximately 14% while ARM has a much lower market share of only 










Demand in the industry is not driven by final consumers, but instead by the needs of the 
industrial sectors that interact with the semiconductors industry. The main absorber of 
semiconductors is the data processing industry, followed by communications and consumer 






























































Figure 2: Market Shares in 
semiconductors 
(Datamonitor) 
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sectors that consume a huge amount of semiconductors. The sectors that have the greatest 
importance for our companies are the Data processing and consumer electronics sectors. 
Table 3: Revenue by Final Application (PWC – A change of pace in the semiconductor industry) 
Application 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Data Processing 39,0% 38,9% 38,2% 39,6% 38,1% 
Communications 26,1% 25,4% 25,5% 24,2% 24,4% 
Consumer Electronics 17,3% 17,9% 18,2% 19,6% 20,1% 
Automotive 7,1% 7,4% 7,7% 5,4% 6,5% 
Industrial 10,5% 10,4% 10,4% 11,2% 10,9% 
 
These divisions within the semiconductor market create a variety of small markets, which are 
the markets we are really interested in. 
For instance Samsung, the second biggest player of the industry, produces mainly memories 
and storage components and also Analog ICs and image sensors, segments where Intel has 
only a minor presence and ARM does not compete.  
3.1.1.1. Microprocessors 
With that in mind it is important to have a closer look at the segment that is really at stake: the 
microprocessors segment. Historical data for market shares and sales are not readily available 
but some data from 2010 is known. 
The market can be divided into different dimensions, namely the architecture used and the 
destination platform. The most used architectures are the x86 (Intel and AMD are the main 
producers); ARM developed by ARM; Cell Broadband Engine Architecture developed jointly by 
IBM, Sony and Toshiba; Power Architecture developed by IBM and Sun Scalable Processor 
Architecture developed by Oracle. From all this we will focus our attention on the two most 
widely used: x86 and ARM. As destination platforms we have desktops, notebooks, netbooks, 
tablets and smartphones. Servers will not be present in our analysis because we do not expect 
them to be in the center of the dispute between x86 and ARM architecture. 
As one can easily see in the graph below, the x86 architecture dominates the segments where 
processing power is the final objective: Desktops, notebooks and also the netbooks. ARM 
architecture is most used in low power devices, given its greater efficiency and lower energy 
consumption, providing longer battery life for portable devices, like tablets and smartphones. 
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Figure 4: Unit Sales by platform 
 
A closer look at the 
notebook, netbooks and 
desktop segment shows that 
these segments are 
dominated by Intel, with 
market shares always above 
70%. AMD also plays an 
important role in these 
segments, with market 
shares that can reach almost 30% in the desktop segment. 
By the other side the smartphone and tablet markets are dominated by the various providers 
of ARM architecture – Qualcomm, Broadcom, Texas Instruments, Nvidia, among others. 
This dual market is expected to end in the near future, with both architectures entering the 
segments of the other one. Notebooks and Netbooks using ARM architecture are already 
planned for 2012 and Intel already announced mobile phones with Atom processors for the 
second quarter of 2012. With this said the trend for the future should be for architectures to 
lose some ground where they are very strong, and on the other side to gain share where they 
are not present right now. For now, ARM seems to start with a small advantage, because the 
lower power of their devices is compensated by a larger battery-life, and even if some 
computers already reach about ten hours of battery life, for sure there is a market for 
computers than can run for longer than ten hours without the need of external power. 
However, for Intel to make the other way around, it should be slightly more difficult, as actual 
smartphones have some troubles running for an entire day if not idle (browsing the web, 
playing music, receiving e-mail), and Intel processors are believed to be more powerful but 
also more power hungry. 
However during the past years Intel has achieved incredible progresses, both on performance 
and power consumption of his x86 processors for computers and notebooks, giving AMD a 
secondary role in those markets, and it is difficult to imagine that, with their research 
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capabilities (more than $6Bn in 2010) and some time, Intel will not be able to fiercely compete 
with ARM products. 
3.1.2. Margins and Growth 
The data collected regarding profit margins, across the entire market, is scarce and only 
accounts for 2007 and 2008.  
The values represented in the graph are the average profit margins collected by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) in their report. The averages for 2008 are all negative with special 
focus on the memory IDM companies, where high installed capacity and the world economic 
downturn created a downward pressure on prices, leading to the losses we can see here. It is 
interesting to note that Intel over perform their IC IDM peers in both 2007 and 2008 and also 
that ARM does better than the average of the companies presented. The lack of a control 
group for ARM should also be noticed, as the segment is not relevant enough for PWC to 
present values on the IP companies. 
The values presented for margins can be in part explained by a market with a very cyclical 
behavior. During periods of high growth operating margins usually assume higher values, as 
installed capacity is not enough to satisfy all the demand, while in periods of economic 
contraction, the accumulation of stocks and the excess installed capacity create the conditions 
for price falls that lead to negative profits. During the last 20 years this process has happened 
repeatedly, and sometimes with incredible contractions and expansions in the total market 
size. 
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Figure 5: Profit Margins for the Semiconductor Industry (PWC – A change of pace in the semiconductor industry) 




As it is possible to see in the graph the growth of almost 40% in 2000 was followed by a sharp 
downfall of about 30% in 2001, to lower values that the ones from 1999. Due to this 
characteristic of the market, many firms opted to accumulate a great portion of capital, in 
order to accommodate some negative years and enjoy the high CAGR this market as 
proportioned during the last 20 years (8.9% in the 1988-2008 period). 
3.1.3. Market Prospects and Trends 
The last years saw the semiconductors and microprocessors industry diverging from the 
historical performance the industry was used to achieve. However the next years should bring 
a return to high growth and to higher profits. Growth should be achieved by higher unit sales 
in developing countries and by new products and also increased unit sales in developed 
economies. 
The following years should also experience the following trends in the market: 
1. Platforms are going mobile. Microprocessor receptors are increasingly portable or 
mobile equipments – smartphones or tablets. The number of desktop sales should 
even decrease until 2015 according to Royal Bank of Scotland expectations. This will 
create the need for more energy efficient microprocessors, which can increase the 
battery life of these smaller devices. The fourth generation of cellular wireless should 
also be a factor with positive influence with respect to this factor. 




















































































































Figure 6: Semiconductor Historical Sales (PWC – A change of pace in the semiconductor industry) 
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Figures 7a e 7b: Unit’s predictions (Royal Bank of Scotland) for microprocessors sales and revenue estimation 
(using Intel asp predictions) until 2015 
 
2. Cloud Computing. With the increase in the number of small and relatively low power 
devices, cloud computing is on the next door. This means that the work that is done 
nowadays in each device, will be done in the future in some datacenter, with enough 
processing power to run heavy applications, and the mobile device should only be seen 
as an interface between the end user and the application. 
3. Integration of several semiconductor components into one chip set. Both Intel and 
AMD already have solutions that provide both processing and graphic units in only one 
chip set and more and more similar architectures should reach the market in the near 
future. This solution provides greater energy efficiency and also better performance 
than the separate components would provide. 
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3.2. Recent Trends in M&A market and insights semiconductor industry 
In 2011 the global M&A market should still be far from reach the value achieved in 2007. Since 
then the M&A market faced tough years, with lack of confidence and credit restrictions. 2009 
was the year with the least transactions and value transacted. Private equity firms were the 
ones that contributed the most for this scenario, given that in 2009 the volume they created 
was almost 10% of the volume transacted in 2007. Corporate transactions also suffered but 
they sustained the market during 2008 and 2009. It is important to notice that, if M&A volume 
decreased a lot, the volume as a share of global market capitalization remained fairly stable, 
which is and indicator that M&A was not as harshly affected as it may seem.  
Figure 8: M&A trend (A Global View on M&A 2011 – KPMG) 
 
During the last months the volume of transactions increased and in 2010 the market recovered 
for 2008 values. The year in progress is expected to continue the recovery and some big deals 
already happened in the first quarter of the year. Leading the recovery, the energy sector 
provided some deals early this year (Duke Energy Corporation acquisition of Progress Energy 
Inc. valuated in more than $25Bn is just an example). Telecommunications is another sector 
that provided big deals, the most notorious being the acquisition of T-Mobile USA Inc. by AT&T 
in a deal valuated in $39Bn. 
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This increase in M&A activity is being fuelled by different objectives, from consolidation in 
Telecoms, to expansion objectives in Consumers giants. In the technology sector there is also 
an increase in M&A activity in the first quarter of 2011, with a share of 4,5% in the total M&A 
activity measured in values, which corresponds to almost $28Bn, $18Bn more than in the same 
period last year. There are several reasons for this increase in the technology sector. First of 
all, businesses seek to provide an end-to-end business solution. Intel acquisition of Mcafee and 
Oracle acquisition of Sun Microsystems are just two examples of companies trying to offer a 
wider range of products to consumers. Cloud computing is in the next corner and companies 
are also trying to get ready for what is to come. Virtualization and networking technologies will 
be the key in this new cloud computing environment, and companies with cutting edge 
management tools and the most flexible security products will be the most probable 
acquisition targets. In the end all of this will be possible due to the rich cash balances 
accumulated during the crisis by technology companies. 
3.2.1. Intel and ARM recent acquisitions 
Even during the crisis Intel and ARM made several acquisitions, widening their capabilities and 
providing better offering in their micro processing solutions. 
ARM made several acquisitions since the creation of the company. These acquisitions are 
usually small and intend to use the technologies of these companies. The last acquisition 
announced was the bought of Obsidian Software, a privately owned firm expert in verification 
and validation used in the design of increasingly complex processors. Before that, in 2006 the 
company acquired Falanx, a developer of 3D graphic accelerators and SOISIC, a company 
specialized in physical IP. 
The hottest period of acquisitions by Intel was between 1997 and 2002, when the company 
acquired about forty companies. In more recent years Intel has not been so active in the 
market, however in the last year it announced several acquisitions: Wind River, Wireless 
Solutions Business of Infineon (WLS) and most recently McAfee in a deal valued in $7.68Bn. 
The most interesting for our case is the acquisition of WLS, which already provides Intel with 
an access to ARM technology for Smartphones and other mobile applications. 
3.2.2. Rational for the deal 
Despite the multiple deals Intel conducts every year, few should have the dimension of the 
proposed one. Most acquisitions are done to get access to small new technologies that can be 
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incorporated in already existing components. Some others, as the case of McAfee right now, 
are used to provide more complete solutions in their products. 
This particular deal is different from the two previous pointed cases. ARM does not represent 
some small new technologies that can be incorporated into existing Intel microprocessors, and 
ARM also does not represent some technologies outside Intel core business, as it is the case of 
McAfee. ARM is in fact a competitor of Intel, with totally different microprocessor 
architecture. The particular reasons that make this buying attractive for Intel are the following: 
1. Getting rid of the threat ARM represents in the netbook/notebook space, particularly 
in the low end segment, where performance is not that important, and weight, 
battery-life and price are key. Nowadays this segment is dominated by Intel, with a 
small share owned by AMD, but ARM processors are now trying to enter this market, 
being tablets the entrance door. It is critical for Intel to maintain its position here 
because the notebook/netbook space represents more than 25% of Intel total 
revenue. 
2. Entering the tablet/smartphone market, which Intel is already trying but without much 
success. If in 2015 Intel had 15% of market share in smartphones, that would give 
them about $2.5Bn revenues per year, which is respectable but relatively small when 
compared to the notebook business that should be worth more than $15Bn by then. 
However if they could reach a market share more similar to the one ARM is predicted 
to dominate by then, Intel could collect almost $10Bn in revenues in 2015. The same, 
even if in a lower degree, scenario is applicable to tablets. 
It will be difficult to get immediate results from this strategy, as the technology that 
should be used in the next few years is already licensed. However as the time goes by 
and the licensed technology becomes obsolete, Intel should create and edge that can 
guarantee the technologic leadership of the market. This should not happen before 
2014/2015. 
3. Capture a larger share of the added value than ARM does. Nowadays the typical value 
of a tablet microprocessor rounds $20. This is also the target price for the processors 
of the most powerful smartphones.  
ARM receives a fee of about 1-2.5% which translates in 20 to 50 cents of dollar for 
each processor. Intel would be able to receive the entire value of the microprocessor. 
A simple exercise can exemplify how Intel would put this in practice. 
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Table 4: Revenue Hypothesis for the smartphones and Tablet markets 
Company 
Smartphone and Tablet 
Units/year 
Average Selling Price Revenue/year 
ARM ~272M 20 USD * 2% = 0,4 USD $108M 
Intel 50M 20 USD $1 Bn 
 
Even if Intel could only take about 50M of the current 270M units being sold nowadays 
by ARM, Intel revenues would be approximately ten times larger. 
If Intel manages to keep a gross margin in line with its historical one, about 60%, each 
chip will be much more valuable for Intel than what they are nowadays for ARM and 
Intel will be able to extract much more revenue than ARM from this market. 
4. Getting return from the cash reserves. Intel has a total of $22Bn ($5.5Bn in cash and 
$16.4Bn in short-term assets) that can be used to finance new investments and 
provide better returns to shareholders. With this amount Intel can easily buy ARM and 
also keep a cash amount that provides liquidity enough to keep the business running 
without concerns. 
The deal would also face some difficulties. If a counter-bid by one company alone does not 
seem likely (actual ARM customers do not have the dimension to carry the deal easily), a deal 
from a consortium of several of that companies would not seem so improbable. The actual 
ARM customers seem to be the ones that can lose the most from this deal and it seems natural 
that they would try to keep “their” research company working with them instead of losing it 
for their main competitor. 
Another possible barrier would be the approval of the transaction by competition authorities, 
given that Intel already has such a dominant position in the microprocessor market, and this 
transaction would just increase that dominance.  
3.3. Company Analysis 
3.3.1. Intel Corporation 
Intel is the largest semiconductor company in the world, with total sales in 2010 totalizing 
more than 43 billion Dollars. The company was founded in 1968 by Gordon Moore and Robert 
Noyce, former employees of Fairchild Semiconductors. The company initially focused its 
business on memory devices, namely in static random access memory (SRAM) chips, before 
turning its attention to other types of devices. 
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 In 1971 Intel presented the first microprocessor in the history, the Intel 4004, developed for a 
calculator. In 1972 they followed with one of the first microcomputers and during the 
seventies Intel developed some more work in the field on microprocessors. It was only during 
the decade of 1980 that, with reduced profitability in the memories market and the success of 
the IBM personal computer, Intel changed the business model and focused its attention on 
microprocessors. During the eighties and the last decade of the 20th century Intel met 
incredible growth and the Pentium brand became a beacon in the industry. 
Turning into the new century Intel faced some challenges, posed by slower growth in demand 
for high-end microprocessors and increased competition from Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) 
in Intel main market (x86 architecture microprocessors). AMD entered the market initially 
through low-end and mid-range processors, but it achieved significant market share across the 
entire product range. 
It was only in 2006 that Intel started to react to the challenge posed to its market position. 
Faced with declining market shares and profits Intel introduced a new product development 
program. This program was based on a quicker architecture development regarding 
microprocessors and it delivered results very quickly. In 2007 Intel launched its Core 
architecture, which was a huge improvement over the previous generation performance and 
just like that Intel regained the domination it had enjoyed several years before. Since then 
Intel continued to improve its products and has nowadays a clear domination of the x86 
microprocessor market. 
By the end of the decade, Intel has regained his position as the uncontestable leader of the 
market.  In 2010 its main source of revenue continues to be Microprocessors but Intel also has 
entered into other business areas. Chipsets and motherboards are offered by Intel has a mean 
to complete their microprocessor offer, given that the entire set is necessary for a computer to 
work; wired and wireless connectivity solutions are available, both in the form of embedded 
cards for desktops, notebooks and netbooks or more complex solutions for fixed or mobile 
networks; NAND flash memory, for use in consumer electronics, as cameras or music players, 
or in the form of solid-state drives (SSD), is also part of the Intel product portfolio. 
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3.3.1.1. Business Structure 
Figure 9: Intel Revenue by Operating Segment                    Figure 10: Revenue Growth by Segment 
 
Intel is divided into five operating segments. The PC Client Group offers microprocessors and 
related chipsets for the desktop, notebook and netbook markets. It also offers motherboards 
and wireless connectivity products related to this segment. The range of microprocessors 
available goes from the i7 second generation desktop processor to the energy efficient Atom 
processor for netbooks. In 2009 more than 75% of the total revenue of this segment was 
originated by microprocessors sales, and only the rest from all the other components. 
The Data Center Group activity is related with the products sold to companies for use on 
servers, workstations, datacenters or cloud computing environments. Xeon and Itanium are 
the families of processors now in use in the field. The importance of microprocessors in this 
segment is even more evident than in the PC Client Group with more than 82% of revenue 
driven by microprocessors sales. 
The Embedded and Communications Group - offers processors and chipsets for embedded 
components for industrial, medical and in-vehicle applications - together with the Ultra-
Mobility Group - supplies Atom processors for handsets - and the Digital Home Group - supply 
several products for applications in consumer electronics (digital TVs, Blu-ray devices, Hard-
Disk Drives, among others) - form the Other Intel Architecture Operating Segment. This is the 
group where the new revenues by increased sales from ARM processors should be included. 
Other revenue comes from the NAND solutions group and the Wind River Software Group, 
which offers software solutions for embedded and handset segments.  
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Revenues on the PC Client Group are due to sales of processors to desktops, notebooks and 
netbooks. Jointly with the sales of MCUs and other components, this group is responsible for 
the greatest share of Intel revenue. A future increase of revenue from microprocessors for 
smartphones and tablets would increase the dimension of the Ultra Mobility Group and create 
another representative segment in Intel revenues, together with the PC Client Group and the 
Data Center Group. 
3.3.1.2. Margins and Profits 
Despite being in a very cyclical industry, and the 2008 and 2009 world crisis, Intel managed to 
achieve positive profits in the last years. In 2010 with the economy starting to recover from 
the worst slump, in the developed economies, since the great depression Intel achieved its 
best results ever, with high increases in its operating margin. 
3.3.2. ARM 
Advanced RISC Machines (ARM) was born in 1990 in a spin off from Acorn. At that time Acorn 
was working with Apple to create a new microprocessor standard. In 1991 the company 
licensed its first design: the ARM6 microprocessor. Right from the beginning the company was 
focused on low cost processors for applications in low cost PCs or small devices. In 1992 Apple 
used the ARM 610 based on the ARM6 architecture as the basis for its Newton PDA. Two years 
later, Acorn launched the RISC PC, with the same ARM 610 processor. 
During the nineties ARM continued to grow and in 1997 acquired Palmchip Corporation in 
order to enter the disk drive market. In 1998 the company entered the stock market, becoming 
listed on the London Stock Exchange and on the NASDAQ. From then on ARM conducted a 
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series of acquisitions in a variety of fields, from software to companies specialized in the 
development of physical IP. 
Nowadays the company based in Cambridge, employ about 1900 people, 63% of them 
engineers. In 2010 total revenue was 631 Million Dollars, more than half of them from 
royalties. 
3.3.2.1. Business Structure 
ARM operates a very particular business model in the industry. Being an Intellectual Property 
Supplier firm means that ARM does not produce the products it designs. Instead ARM licenses 
them to another semiconductor firms which may be interested in developing and 
commercialize them.  
ARM projects usually go through three phases during its life. In the first phase new products 
are created by ARM through research and development. During this period of two to three 
years the totally of the costs are supported by ARM. During the next three/four years, ARM 
licenses its products to companies which are interested in commercialize them. The product is 
then developed further by the companies who are interested in producing them, according to 
ARM specifications, and ARM receives a license fee.  
The last phase is related with the production of the products. During this phase ARM no longer 
has contact with the projects but it has the right to receive a fee for each device produced. 
ARM usually receives fees of about 1 to 2% of the value of the chip, what points for a royalty of 
about 1.50$ for each processor produced for nowadays smart phones. The amount ARM 
receives depends a lot on the sophistication of the processor but the trend seen in the last 
years is for mobile devices to get smarter and that means that chips are getting more powerful 
and more expensive, which means increased revenue by device for ARM. ARM also has 
additional revenue from sales of development systems and services but this area is not the 
main focus of the company. 
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During the last years ARM revenues have been increasing, benefiting from the increasing 
number of features in nowadays mobile phones and from the increasing of the 
computerization of various aspects of today’s life, from car systems, to industrial applications. 
The sales of licenses was relatively flat in the last years, only booming during 2010 with firms 
trying to re-positioning themselves after a couple years of savings in investments. However, 
the accumulation of licenses sold is providing ARM with a large and increasing source of 
revenue from royalties. ARM covers about 90% of the mobile phone market and it has already 
licensed the technology that should appear during the next 2/3 years in the top mobile 
phones. This also applies, however not in a so dominant scale, in other markets, with ARM 
holding significant market share and already placed to earn royalties during the next years. 
3.3.2.2. Margins and profits 
ARM, as Intel, also achieved profits during the last years despite the crisis in the sector in 2008 
and 2009. ARM business model also distinguishes itself by presenting a very high gross margin, 
with the cost of sales being very low. This structure would be very appealing in the case ARM 
increased its sales, keeping staff and administrative costs under control. This is indeed the case 
made by ARM board of directors, claiming that in the future they intend to pay its costs with 
licensing activities and keep revenues from royalties entirely as profits. 
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Figure 13:  ARM Net Income (in thousands of GBP) and Operating Margin 
As it is possible to check, the pattern in the last three years is quite similar to Intel, mainly in 
2010 with a large boom both in the operating margin and Net Income. 
Figure 14: Licensing Revenues vs. OPEX (in thousands of GBP) 
Comparing Licensing revenues with OPEX is easy to understand that the objective stated 
before, covering for costs with licensing revenues, will not be easily achieved. Actually looking 
at the graph the idea one gets is that, in the best of the cases, licensing are covering a 
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4. Company Valuation 
4.1. Intel 
Intel will be evaluated using a WACC Discounted Cash Flow model with a 5 year explicit period. 
The estimation of FCFF will be made in steps. The first consist in the estimation of Net Income, 
and only then it will be done the estimation of FCFF. We will estimate revenues, merging two 
different components. One component is estimated with unit sales, prices and market shares 
estimations, this component is supposed to represent the most significant part of the business 
we are interested in, namely the microprocessor business. The other component represents 
the remaining business of Intel, from Servers to other services provided by Intel, where 
estimations will not present the same detail we have in the first component. Then assumptions 
will be made regarding gross margin. R&D and Administrative costs will also be estimated to 
reach net income. Then we need some assumptions regarding Depreciation, Capex and 
Working Capital to reach FCFF. 
Until 2010 the values used are the ones reported in Intel annual report. From then on 
estimations were made, using data from Goldman Sachs (GS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
to estimate market size and market shares in the microprocessors market; historical growth 
rates and Price Waterhouse Coopers predictions were used to estimate revenue growth in the 
other areas of the business. 
4.1.1. Revenues and Gross Margin 
Intel revenues were estimated by groups. As presented earlier the business is divided into 
several groups: the PC Client Group, the Data Center Group, Other Intel Architecture Operating 
Segments and Other Revenues that aggregate some small groups inside Intel. We will focus 
our attention in the PC client group, where estimations for processor sales will be made, and 
also in Other Intel Architecture Operating Segments, where the Ultra Mobility Group is 
included. 
To construct the analysis we took numbers from RBS report on ARM and Goldman Sachs 
report on Intel to get estimated unit sales until 2015. On top of that we made estimations for 
Intel market shares, based on Goldman Sachs figures until 2012 and then until 2015 based on 
the estimated market share for ARM by RBS, while also accommodating the presence of AMD 
in the market. We then used the actual figures of average selling prices (ASP) for each type of 
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microprocessor and added the trend predicted by RBS. The final result was estimated revenues 
from the sales of microprocessors for several types of platforms. This procedure was 
conducted for Desktops, Notebooks, Netbooks, Tablets and Smartphones. Revenues from 
Desktops, Notebooks and Netbooks were then included in the PC Client Group, and revenues 
from Smartphones and Tablets were included in the Other Intel Architecture Operating 
Segments. We tried to match the sales for 2010 using these numbers. As we obviously did not 
match exactly the sales value, reaching lower values than the reported ones, we calculated a 
delta (the difference between the reported values and our calculations).  
Intel revenues 
totalize about 
$45Bn a year, 
what means 
that we are 
estimating 




however we are estimating almost all of Intel revenue, being servers the only platform missing 
the analysis. Those were not included because we do not think ARM will have an active role in 
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Figure 15: Microprocessor revenue estimations for Intel 2010-2015 
Figure 16: Microprocessor revenue growth estimations for Intel 2011-2015 
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The most important fact to retain from this analysis is the fact that we are not predicting high 
growth for Intel in the microprocessor market for our period, in fact we are even predicting a 
negative evolution in 2011, mainly due to reduced revenue in the desktop segment, and then 
modest growth. The CAGR for the total prediction is less than 2% per year, and this is 
explained by the expected decrease in Desktop market size and Intel market share and also for 
the loss of market share notebooks and netbooks. The penetration of ARM territory in 
Smartphones and tablets is really the most positive point in our predictions, with average 
growth of about 70% per year from 2012 to 2015, however these segments should continue a 
small share of total revenues. 
For the remaining revenue we assumed a constant growth rate until 2015. The growth rate 
used is the Price Waterhouse Coopers prediction for the next two years in the semiconductor 
industry: 9.2%. We used this value, even if it seems too high, because Asia is providing the 
industry with very high growth rates, and it is in line with the growth achieved by the industry 
in the last 20 years (1988-2008): CAGR of 8.9%. 
With respect to gross margins we also followed the Goldman Sachs belief that the high value 
achieved in 2010 is not sustainable, both because it is not in line with historical values and also 
because the change to a 22nm technology should increase costs in the near future. Adding to 
these factors, increased competition in some platforms by ARM providers should also create 
downward pressure on prices. 
Table 5: Intel Gross Margin Predictions 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Intel Gross Margin 65% 61% 59% 57% 55% 54% 
4.1.2. Administrative Costs and R&D 
Operating expenses account for almost as much as cost of sales. Operating Expenses are 
mainly composed by Administrative Costs and R&D. Intel expenditure with these items is 
historically high, having spent something as $6.7Bn in R&D in 2010. 
As competition should became stronger in the next few years there is no reason for spending 
with these items to decrease. AMD continues to push prices down, bringing competition to the 
low end desktop/notebook market; by the other side ARM promises to continue developing 
performance in the Smartphone/Tablet space and already made public its intentions of enter 
the netbook/notebook space. With all these factors known, Intel already announced its 
intention of spending $8.2Bn in R&D during 2011. This figure is justified with the efforts of 
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implementing the 22nm technology and also increased efforts to enter the mobile space, 
developing more efficient processors. 
Given the market 
conditions, it is not 
expectable that Intel can 
reduce expenditures with 
these items. We 
calculated R&D as 19% of 
the previous year 
revenues. This value is in 
line with the last two 
years spending and is an 
effort for Intel to keep its 
technological advantage 
in the x86 market, and also to penetrate the mobile segment. 
Administrative costs include marketing, general and administrative costs and they are 
generally constant. Given this there is no reason to think that big differences from the previous 
years should arise here, so he simply used the average of the last five years with relation to 
revenues to estimate the future numbers. 17% of total revenue was the value used to estimate 
administrative costs. 
4.1.3. Taxes 
Intel 2010 Annual report states that Intel effective average tax rate is about 29%. Despite the 
marginal tax rate in the United States being about 40%, Intel benefits from deductions due to 
R&D expenses and other exceptions. Given that the tax rate of 29% is assumed for the entire 
period of analysis and also for the terminal value.   
4.1.4. Capex, Depreciation and Working Capital 
Capital expenditures were quite high during the last few years, more than doubling 
depreciation in 2007 and 2010. Capex should continue higher than depreciation during the 
next years, to accommodate the necessary investments for the implementation of 22nm 
technology and for increasing the installed capacity during next years. For 2011 Capex was 
taken from 2010 Intel Annual Report and for the following years it was calculated as the 
Figure 17: R&D and Administrative costs estimations for Intel 2011-2015 
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amount necessary to keep an adequate level of fixed and intangible assets. We estimated a 
total of $37Bn Dollars of Capex for the next five years, what compares with the $39Bn of the 
last five. The main reason for the lower value is the absence of any peak, as we had in 2007 
($10Bn) and 2010 ($10.5Bn). 
Regarding depreciation and amortization we do not have separate data for both series, and 
only a joint value is available. This value averages 9% of the representative assets and this is 
the percentage that will be applied to calculate depreciation and amortization for the next five 
years. 
Working capital is the difference between some short term assets, as accounts receivable and 
inventory, and short term liabilities. In average the evolution should be favorable to Intel given 
that Liabilities should increase faster than this group of assets. 
4.1.5. Cost of Capital 
Intel cost of capital is a result of the combination of its various components. Cost of equity was 
calculated with three components: the risk free rate (US 10 year bond – 3,42%); the market 
risk premium for the US, taken from Fernandez and Del Campo (2010) in a paper which collects 
evidence on the rates used by several companies and institutions during 2010 as the market 
risk premium for several countries, the value for the US is 5,1%, a value very close to the one 
advanced by Damodaran for the advanced economies – 5%; and the beta for the company is 
the average between the Damodaran database beta and my calculations (respectively 1,15 and 
1,095) - own calculations using monthly returns for Intel since 2006, the market return index 
was S&P 500. Altogether, the value reached was 9,15% for cost of equity. Cost of debt was 
calculated summing a spread on the US risk free rate. The spread was calculated using S&P 
rating for long term debt: Intel debt is rated as A+, which translates in a 0,85% spread. The 
total cost of debt is 4,27%. 
Intel has almost no debt, as only 2% of its capital structure is debt. This is a usual structure 
within technology companies, which tend to accumulate a vast amount of cash and no debt to 
survive the cyclicality of the sector. The final value for cost of equity was estimated at 9,02%.  
 All the values used for calculations are from the 29th of April 2011. 
Table 6: Cost of Capital Details for Intel 
Levered 
Beta 










1,122605 3,42% 0,85% (A+) 5,10% 29% 4,27% 9,15% 9,02% 
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4.1.6. Company valuation and Multiples Valuation 
The final value for Intel using our estimates is approximately $127.5Bn. This is the result of the 
sum of the first four years of discounted cash flows and the Terminal Value which assumes a 
perpetual growth rate of 3,5%. If we subtract the debt value, $2.39Bn, the equity value of Intel 
is about $125.1Bn (the complete valuation can be found in the Appendix 4). This value 
compares with a market cap of approximately $122.5Bn. The values are from the 29th of April 
2011. Trying to find if this value is in line with the market we conducted a peer analysis using 
multiples (the data for control group can be found in the Appendix 5). 
Table 7: Estimated Free Cash Flow and Company Value for Intel 
Intel Valuation 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 and TV 
FCFF $5.484.521.841 $6.801.225.059 $7.847.808.694 $7.160.964.506 $8.249.002.643 
Discounted Value $5.030.645.927 $5.722.121.939 $6.056.243.817 $5.068.873.412 $105.584.608.248 
Company Value $127.462.493.344 Debt Value $2.393.000.000 Equity Value $125.069.493.344 
 
Our analysis for Intel uses data from eight mature technology companies and our multiples are 
focused on sales and EBITDA. We estimated a multiple of 2,68 for sales and 12,14 for EBITDA. 
The sales multiple for Intel returns a market value of $123Bn and for the EBITDA multiple the 
value is $195Bn.The multiple for sales almost gets the exact value of our Valuation however 
the Earnings Multiple gets us a much greater value than our valuation. 
Table 8: Multiples Valuation for Intel 
Price/Sales Multiplier 2,68 Value Sales $123.315.573.422 
Price/Earnings Multiplier 12,14 Value Earnings $195.921.190.633 
 
 There may be several reasons for these results but there seems to be one main reason to 
explain these findings. The most plausible factor we found explaining these results is the fact 
that Intel margin is expected to decrease during the next few years. It can also be the fact that 
margins of the control group are expected to increase or some mix with Intel margins 
decreasing and control group margins increasing, which would explain why Intel is trading in 
such a low multiple on earnings while trading at a more normal multiple on sales. 
4.2. ARM 
The model used to evaluate ARM will be similar to the one used to evaluate Intel: a WACC 
Discounted Cash Flow model with a 5 year explicit period. The method used will also be the 
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same. The estimation of Net income will be followed by estimations of Depreciation and 
Amortization, Capex and Changes in Net Working Capital to get FCFF.  Revenues are estimated 
using two components, one of them respects to licensing and a share of royalties’ revenues, 
using historical growth rates and PWC predictions, the second component estimates the 
remaining share of royalties’ revenues using market share predictions, unitary prices, market 
sizes and the fees received by ARM.  
4.2.1. Revenues and Gross Margin 
Detailed revenues for ARM were estimated in USD, given that the most detailed information 
provided by ARM concerning revenues is in USD and also because market prices are set in USD. 
Once the estimation was done the value was converted to GBP. The estimation was done using 
two components, the first one estimated revenues arising from licensing activities, a share of 
royalties’ revenues and other revenues, the second one is responsible for the remaining share 
of royalties’ revenues, namely the share correspondent to microprocessors, and is responsible 
for about one third of total revenues. 
Figure 18a and 18b: Revenue by estimation method and revenue growth breakdown by source 
  
The first component was calculated using the PWC prediction of 9.2% growth in the 
semiconductor industry for the near future, which is in line with the historic growth rate of the 
industry during the last 20 years (and well below ARM growth predictions by industry 
analysts). 
The second component is the most important and should reflect the royalties’ revenues from 
microprocessors sales in the next few years. Market size estimations are the same used for 
Intel, market shares are derived from RBS and Goldman Sachs numbers, and unit prices are 
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to desktops. In smartphones the prediction is for ARM to lose share, from its current 90% 
share to 70% in 2015, however given the huge increase in market size, unit sales using ARM 
architecture will more than double, from the current 250 million units to 570 million units. This 
alone should represent the biggest share of royalties. The remaining revenues should come 
from tablets, netbooks, notebooks and desktops and other royalties (controllers, memories, 
and other kinds of components). 
Figure 19: ARM unit estimation revenue detail (Blue bars in the graphic 11) 
 
Notebooks will become the second largest source of revenue despite the low penetration ARM 
should achieve in that market, by the other side ARM should continue to be the dominant firm 
in the tablets market, however given the small size of the tablets market, revenue from tablets 
will not achieve relevant values. 
The growth expectations presented here, despite amazing, are explained by the growth 
expected in the smartphones market, the licensing done in the last years, which should create 
more royalty revenues in the years to come and the announcement in December 2010 by 
Microsoft, that Windows 8 will be compatible with ARM architecture, which is a tremendous 
opportunity for ARM to penetrate x86 market, namely notebooks. 
Product and Service costs were estimated as a share of licensing revenue. This is so because 
royalties by principle should not be accountable for any costs, and sources for what ARM 
consider “other revenue” are not easily identifiable. Product costs were set at 19% and service 
costs at 7% of licensing revenue. As licensing is becoming less relevant for total revenue this 
should increase gross margin as time goes by. In our estimation gross margin increases from 
92% in 2011 to 93% in 2015, not matching, however, the margin from 2010, 94%. 
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4.2.2. Administrative Costs and R&D 
 ARM has been able to keep costs under control, maintaining costs as a stable share of 
licensing revenues. Using that assumption we assumed costs as a fixed percentage of licensing 
revenue. This assumption has a positive and a negative aspect. If by one side we keep 
estimations in line with historical costs, by the other side, using shares of licensing revenue to 
estimate costs, we cannot achieve the results intended by ARM board – paying all the costs 
with licensing revenue. Summing up, General and Administrative costs were set at 52% of 
licensing revenues, Sales and Marketing at 54% of the same revenue and R&D were set at 90%. 
This totalizes 196% of licensing revenue, highlighting our previous comments. Once again, as 
royalties are assumed to have an increased impact in revenue, net margin should continue to 
increase in the next few years, reaching 45% in 2015 from 27% in 2010. 
Figure 20: Cost as a percentage of total revenue 
 
4.2.3. Taxes 
The conviction in the UK is that government should decrease taxes on profits until they reach 
24% in 2014, from the actual value of 28%. We assumed they would decrease 1% every year, 
which will yield 24% in 2014. Adding to this we also included in our estimation a benefit of 5% 
of the amount spent in R&D, according to ARM 2010 annual report indications. 
4.2.4. Capex, Depreciation and Working Capital 
As we had already done for Intel, Capex was calculated as the amount needed to compensate 
Depreciation and keep fixed and intangible assets in an appropriate level for the ARM sales 
volume. 
Data for depreciations and amortizations is given jointly by ARM and we have no means to 
isolate them. We used the historical rate we could observe to calculate future rates and we 
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applied 10% for both depreciation and amortization for the relevant assets. In order to 
calculate the Terminal Value we equalized both values. 
Working capital is calculated as the difference between accounts receivable and payable and 
inventory. Working capital turns out to be negative in ARM, which in turn yields that with an 
increasing business, working capital will also increase as a negative value, benefiting ARM 
evaluation, as more and more cash flow can be extracted every year from the company. 
4.2.5. Cost of Capital 
Cost of capital, in the case of ARM, is equal to the cost of equity, given that ARM capital 
structure does not contemplate any debt. To calculate ARM cost of equity we needed a risk 
free rate for GBP. We used the British government 10 year bond to establish the risk free rate. 
The rate used is 3,69%. The market risk premium was taken from Fernandez and Del Campo 
(2010). This paper collects evidence on the rates used by several companies and institutions 
during 2010 as the market risk premium for several countries. The rate for Great Britain is 5,2% 
and once again is very close to the rate Damodaran suggests for the developed economies – 
5%. The beta for ARM was calculated as the average between Damodaran data and my own 
calculations (respectively 0,82 and 0,68) using five years of monthly returns for ARM and the 
Footsie 100. Altogether the cost of capital for ARM is about 7,58%. 
Once again all the values collected are from the 29th of April 2010. 
Table 9: Cost of Capital Details for ARM 
Levered Beta UK 10Y Risk Premium Cost of Equity Cost of Capital 
0,74852 3,69% 5,20% 7,58% 7,58% 
4.2.6. Exchange Rate 
In the valuation of ARM we need exchange rates between USD and GBP. These rates will be 
used to convert ARM estimated revenues into GBP, and also for the conversion of the final 
company value to USD. In order to do that we need exchange rates from 2011 until 2015. We 
calculated that exchange rates using interest rate parity. As rates for GBP are higher than rates 
for USD, the GBP is expected to devaluate when compared with the USD during the next few 
years. It is also important to notice here the fact that ARM is exposed to exchange rate risk. 
This arises from the fact that almost all the revenues made are in USD, which is the currency 
used in the marketplace to determine prices, while the major part of costs are denominated in 
GBP, due to the fact of ARM having headquarters in Great Britain. ARM in its 2010 Annual 
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Report states that this should not be a problem in the near future, both because the currencies 
are not expected to fluctuate that much from current valuations, and also because ARM 
partially hedges its position. For our valuation we disregarded this aspect because the 
exchange rate fluctuations we got were small and, we think, ignorable. 
Table 10: Interest Rates and Exchange Rate Calculation (GBP/USD) 
Interest Yields Spot (2010) 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
UK - 0,66% 1,20% 1,56% 2,02% 2,20% 
US - 0,22% 0,61% 1,01% 1,49% 1,97% 
GBP/USD 1,671 1,663 1,651 1,644 1,636 1,652 
4.2.7. Company Valuation and Multiples Valuation 
The final value for ARM using our estimates is approximately $11.9Bn and, as ARM has no debt 
in its capital structure this value already represents the ARM equity value. Our calculation uses 
four years of discounted cash flows and a Terminal Value in the end which assumes a 
perpetual growth rate of 4% (the complete valuation can be found in the Appendix 6). This 
value compares with a market cap of approximately $13.8Bn. The values are from the 29th of 
April 2011. As we already did for Intel we compared our values with valuations using multiples. 
Table 11: ARM Estimated FCFF and Company Value 
Intel Valuation 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 and TV 
FCFF $178.447.095 $251.034.266 $305.370.533 $378.966.451 $521.289.416 
Discounted Value $166.598.455 $219.447.002 $249.275.140 $288.858.312 $10.985.977.128 
Company Value $11.910.156.036 Debt Value $0 Equity Value $11.910.156.036 
 
Applying multiples this time yields results completely out of line with our estimations and the 
company market value. We used a different set of companies for ARM, which consists on small 
and fast growing technology companies but even with this peer group we could not reach 
satisfactory results (see Appendix 7). Using the sales multiple of 3,89 on 2010 ARM Sales we 
get a company value of approximately $2.4Bn. The Price/Earnings multiple works a little bit 
better but still far away from the intended result. Multiplying ARM earnings by 25,37 we get a 
value of $4.3Bn. As our estimated value is $13Bn we are incredibly away from our estimates.  
Table 12: ARM Multiples Valuation 
Price/Sales Multiplier 3,89 Value Sales $2.447.817.533 
Price/Earnings Multiplier 25,37 Value Earnings $4.321.559.803 
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It is interesting to analyze these results however, as we get for and ARM very poor results. 
ARM is trading at a multiple of 18,8 on sales and 69 on earnings, these growth expectations 
are incredibly high, largely surpassing the growth expected for the sector as a whole and even 
the growth expected for some of the companies in the sector that should grow faster. This, of 
course, results in this amazing difference between valuations using detailed estimations of 
cash flow and those ones just relying on multiples. 
As a final note, I would like to stress that I think our valuation using DCF is correct, despite the 
values obtained using multiples, as the assumptions made seemed quite reasonable all the 
time and we do not even reach the market value of the company. 
  
























Smar phones w/ARM 
4.3. Value of the Merged Company 
Our exercise for the calculation of the value of the merged entity is a bit different than the 
usual in M&A thesis. Instead of calculating the revenues and costs of both firms this approach 
will be focused on the absorption of ARM by Intel. What this means in practice is that ARM is 
basically being dismantled, and their research will not be sold anymore. This knowledge will be 
appropriated by Intel and used to developed new offers in the field of microprocessors and 
controllers. What I expect with this exercise is for Intel to gain (or not to lose so much) market 
share until 2015. ARM licenses are already sold for designs that will be state of the art by 2013 
at least, but after that, the currently available designs should start losing space in the 
performance field, and by then Intel should be capable of gaining space in the low power 
processors segment. This movement should be gradual and I reflected it in Intel market shares 
evolution. Another difference between this and the usual approach is the fact that I am relying 
basically on additional revenue for Intel instead of cost synergies. In fact I think that this deal 
will reduce the overall well being of the society and reduce output and market efficiency. The 
gains I estimate for Intel will be born from decreased profits from competitors and reduced 
competition in the market place. Actually I am not even sure if this deal would be approved by 
competition authorities, namely the European Commission, as it would incredibly increase 
Intel dominance in the market. 
4.3.1. Revenues and Gross Margin 
Revenues are the supreme contributor for gains in this deal. My projections are for Intel to 
increase much more their market share in the mobile space. Additionally I assumed Intel will 
be able to better defend its position on the desktop, notebook and netbook segment, where 
Figure 21: Intel Market Shares by Microprocessor Structure (2011-2015) with and without ARM 
47  M&A: ARM takeover by Intel 
  
 
Intel would lose significant market share in the following years. 
In figure 13 one can understand the differences between the predictions made for Intel alone 
and the new predictions considering that Intel absorbs ARM. For 2011 the predictions are the 
same and the differences only start in 2012, becoming more severe as time goes by. The 
Desktop segment is where we have the smallest difference between the predictions for Intel 
and for the merged entity, as we do not expect ARM to have such an impact in the desktop 
segment, at least in such a short period of time. 
Figure 22a and 22b: Comparison between Joint company and Intel alone revenue from unit estimations 
 
The main changes in the revenue breakdown for Intel are the increase of revenue from 
notebooks, which previously was about $15Bn and now amount to more than $18Bn, and the 
biggest share of revenues from the Smartphone segment, which amount to $4Bn now in 2015. 
Prices are also higher in average, given Intel increased market power. This higher prices reflect 
lower price decreases, as Intel should face much less pressure from competitors, namely in the 
low power, mobile segment. 
Regarding margins we assumed a slightly higher margin from 2013 onwards (57%, 55% and 
54% for 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively). This higher margin is a reflex of higher prices 
charged by Intel. The difference is so small (1%) because we assumed Intel would be very 

































Intel Alone Joint Company 
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4.3.2. Administrative Costs and R&D 
Regarding costs our assumptions kept Intel costs structure unchanged and added part of the 
ARM cost structure to Intel costs. 
Research and development costs from ARM were kept in full, as we regard this component as 
the most important contribution ARM will give Intel. 
For Marketing and sales we made different assumptions. In 2011 the expenses we had 
estimated for ARM would be fully assumed by Intel, from then on the estimated ARM 
expenses would be reduced in 25% every year. This assumption translates in no more 
expenses with these ARM departments from 2015 on (75% in 2012, 50% in 2013, 25% in 2014). 
4.3.3. Taxes 
For taxes we kept our previous assumption of a 29% average tax rate for Intel earnings. 
4.3.4. Capex, Depreciation and Working Capital 
As for taxes, we kept our methodologies in line with the estimations done for Intel. 
Depreciation and Amortization are 9% of the representative assets and Capex and Changes in 
Working Capital were calculated as before.  
4.3.5. Cost of Capital 
Intel cost of capital suffered a minor change, as we adapted it to the new capital structure 
leaving the beta unchanged. The inclusion of ARM in the capital decreased the weight of debt 
marginally in the capital structure. As a result the final cost of capital for Intel is now 8,90% 
instead of 8,89%. The difference for the final valuation is negligible. 
Table 13: Cost of Capital Details for the Merged Entity 
Levered 
Beta 










1,122605 3,42% 0,85% (A+) 5,10% 29% 4,27% 9,15% 9,04% 
4.3.6. Synergy 
Synergies in our specific case are quite difficult to measure. Usually synergies are incurred 
when two similar companies join together and they create more revenue or decrease costs as 
a result. Our specific case is different. The companies are not that similar, even though they 
operate is the same industry. What we estimated as source of gains basically increased 
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revenues. As pointed earlier, when we made the case for the acquisition, Intel should 
appropriate a much bigger share of added value than ARM does nowadays, given that Intel will 
conduct the entire process of designing, producing and selling the processor. Given Intel 
margins this will create great value for Intel even, as it is likely, they cannot capture all the 
market ARM controls nowadays. 
Our estimations give us a market value of more than $125Bn for Intel and about $11.9Bn for 
ARM. The sum of both is almost $137Bn. The value of the joint company amounts to almost 
$149Bn, which yields a total synergy 
of about $11.8Bn. This represents 
99% of ARM market value which is 
an amazing value, however partly 
explained by the fact that much of 
the ability to create value comes 
from Intel huge capabilities. 
This synergy is explained by a much 
higher growth rate in the next five 
years for Intel, with much higher 
revenues, but also much higher costs. This balance however will be greatly positive in the end, 
given that Intel net margin on each unit sold will be much greater than ARM 2% fee. 
When we try to estimate revenue synergy, we get a value of more than $84Bn which is an 
incredible value, and way above the total benefits from the merger, what means that we will 
also have much higher costs. Despite the increase in costs, there are also some synergies 
regarding costs, namely regarding costs previously incurred by ARM. 
Trying to disaggregate that synergy we went through a deeper analysis. First of all we 
subtracted all the expenses calculated as a percentage from the value we considered revenue 
synergy. This way instead of gross revenue increase, we get a net revenue increase, which 
better translates the added value of increased sales derived from the deal. Instead of a 
revenue synergy of more than $84Bn we end up with a synergy of $6.2Bn. 
We also have some cost synergies, as Sales and Marketing and General and Administrative 
Expenses from ARM were reduced through time, as the company gets integrated in a much 
bigger Intel structure. These reductions yield a gain of $4.6Bn. 
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Figure 23: Decomposition of Value and Synergy Value 
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The last gain from the merger arises from higher gross margins. These higher margins are not 
the result of decreased costs, which should not be happening in the near future, but instead 













s Sales and Marketing 20% 
Netbooks 2% General and Administrative 19% 
Desktops 5% Total Cost Synergy 39% 
Tablets 4% 
Increase in Gross Margin 9% Smartphones 13% 
Total Revenue Synergy 52% 
 
The higher revenues are the result if an increased growth rate in the different platforms, which 
can be measured by the increase in CAGRs by platform: 4% on notebooks, 7% on netbooks, 2% 
on desktops, 26% on tablets and 23% on smartphones. The average increase in CAGRs is 4%, as 
notebooks have a very large impact on the total revenues. 
The lower costs come from the fact that we assumed that ARM costs in these areas could be 
reduced by 25% 2012, 50% in 2013, 75% in 2014 and 100% in 2015, when the entire structure 
should be fully integrated with Intel divisions. 
Table 15: Estimated FCFF and Company Value for the Merged Entity 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
FCFF $4.922.832.349 $6.343.095.976 $7.523.445.945 $6.762.333.667 $11.126.872.236 
Discounted 
Value 
$4.514.824.439 $5.335.227.287 $5.803.557.202 $4.784.095.955 $130.734.000.262 
Company Value $151.171.705.145 Debt Value $2.393.000.000 Equity Value $148.778.705.145 
 
We assumed integration costs to be about 10% of actual ARM sales, evenly split through the 
first three years. We used this number based on historical numbers from M&A which points to 
values ranging from 4% until 7/8%. The lack of information of this kind of costs from Intel 
forced us to use an estimate from the remaining market. We used 10% as a conservative 
number. Anyway given the dimension of Intel, and the kind of acquisition we are talking about, 
this $60M will not make great difference in our final numbers. 
  
Table 14: Decomposition Synergy contribuution 
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5. Deal Structure 
5.1. Defining the price to offer 
Table 16: ARM Value, Estimated Value and Synergy 
On the 28th of February 
of 2011 ARM shares 
closed at 617p. This 
means that compared to 
our estimations, ARM shares are 15% overvalued. As our valuation already included some 
amazing growth perspectives, it is amazing the market expectations about ARM growth, 
supporting the price at incredible multiples. 
The value with synergy we calculated is about 73% above the actual market price and this 
leaves room for Intel to pay a decent premium and also keep some value for its shareholders. 
The final price will be dependent on several factors apart from the company value. Among 
those factors the most important are the existence of other bidders, the shareholder structure 
of ARM and how are the capabilities to create synergies distributed among both companies.   
5.1.1. Other potential bidders 
ARM is a very desirable company, which a large range of companies would like to buy. 
However the actual context, with very restrictive credit markets, makes it difficult for smaller 
firms to finance the acquisition.  
Looking at tech firms with dimension enough to conduct the acquisition we find Apple, 
Qualcomm, Samsung Electronics, and maybe Toshiba. 
There is also another type of tech companies that definitely have the dimension but we do not 
regard them as interested in the business. For example Google, which was already pointed as 
interested by some media, definitely has the dimension and cash needed for the deal, IBM, 
Oracle, Toshiba and Nokia would also have the dimension, but all these companies are in a 
separated business which we do not think would be interested in acquire a company as ARM. 
For other companies to compete, they would be probably to join efforts to be able to come up 
with a large enough offer. There are a lot of companies in this group, however I do not think a 
joint offer is very likely. This group of companies would also include the vast majority of actual 
ARM Value % 
Market Cap on 28
th
 February 2010 $ 13.7Bn 100% 
DCF Valuation $ 11.9Bn 87% 
Synergy $ 11.7Bn 86% 
Value With Synergy $ 23.7Bn 173% 
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ARM clients (apart from Apple and Qualcomm): Broadcom, Nvidia, Texas Instruments, Hynix 
Semiconductors and also AMD, which is not an ARM client but is Intel main competitor in the 
microprocessor space 
Analyzing the competitors we would say that an acquisition from a company like Apple or 
Samsung would be very difficult to accept by everyone else: current ARM customers would be 
taken out of this market gradually, and the remaining mobile phones and tablet vendors would 
be forced to acquire components to their rival or someone else with not so good products. 
This would create and enormous pressure for ARM to be sold to someone else than one 
mobile phone company. 
An offer from a hardware vendor like Qualcomm would be less prone to resistance. The 
companies affected by a movement like this would be the other hardware companies, 
however, apart from Intel, there is really no one else with the required dimension to buy a 
company as ARM. Companies like Apple and Samsung would probably face higher prices, due 
to reduced competition but it would affect all of them and not create competitive differences 
between companies. Given these conditions we think that a counter offer from Qualcomm is 
likely to happen, at least if Intel initial offer is not high enough. 
The other hypothesis is a joint offer from the remaining Qualcomm competitors. There are 
pros and cons about this kind of proposal. The biggest reason for them to join the race would 
be that, if they do not, they would lose one of their main contributors for revenues in the 
medium term. However we have some difficulties in understanding the way ARM would be 
managed by a consortium of rival companies. 
Given all this we would say that a Qualcomm offer is likely to happen because it is the 
company alone that has the reasons and the resources to do it. All the other possibilities seem 
unlikely to happen, due to the combinations of the various factors. 
5.1.2. Target Shareholders 
The 10 biggest ARM’s Shareholders control about 31,5% of the company. With this low 
amount of shares owned by large shareholders, there should be no strategic barriers to the 
acquisition. Furthermore the existent shareholders are hedge funds and investment 
companies who should also not be that much interested in strategic questions about the 
semiconductors market. So as long as the offer made by Intel provides a good return for 
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current ARM shareholders there should be no barriers to the deal. Defining what a good return 
may be is not so simple. 
However In the last five years these shareholders had a return of about 35% per year, even in a 
global recession, where almost all shares suffered a severe slump. This very strong 
performance, namely in the two last years, when shares rose from 95 pence to more than 600 
pence, will certainly increase the amount requested by ARM shareholders when facing a 
proposal for their shares. 
Figure 24a and 24b: Shareholder Structure and Share Price Evolution for ARM 
5.1.3. Synergy Sharing and Takeover offer 
Intel two latest acquisitions paid a premium of 44% and 60% for Wind River Systems and 
McAfee respectively. These acquisitions are in line with the normal price paid for technological 
companies, which normally rounds or surpasses 50%. The 44% premium paid for Wind River 
Systems may also be explained by current market situation, with credit difficulties making it 
difficult for other companies to come up with counter-bids.  
Given what we said before, we will suggest a higher premium than the one paid in these two 
deals. First of all this deal will face strong opposition from actual ARM clients, who will lose 
their R&D “department” and should be forced to proceed on their own and against Intel, a 
rival they do not want to face. In second place shareholders expectations are incredibly high 
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expectations. In third place, if the offer is low, it would be quite probable for Qualcomm to 
present a counter-bid. Qualcomm has about $20Bn is cash and short-term assets, what gives 
them the possibility of considering this deal. 
Given the framework, we propose a premium of 55% paid by Intel, which amounts to a total of 
around $21.27Bn or £12.74Bn. This value corresponds to 956,35p per share, compared to a 
market value of 617p per share. 
At this price point we think the offer is very hard to deny and for Qualcomm would be very 
difficult to surpass this price tag, given that they do not share Intel capabilities, which are what 
create possibilities for this high level of synergy. Even with this offer, Intel would keep almost 
$2.5Bn of the synergy to itself, around 21% of total synergy, while eliminating its biggest threat 
in the medium term. 
5.2. Financing the Acquisition 
The merged entity would have available more than $22Bn between cash and short-term 
investments.  
Financing the acquisition entirely with capital is not possible. The alternatives would be to 
issue shares or raise debt. As we already know issuing shares would dilute the returns of 
current shareholders, as we think this deal will deliver the promised value. It would also be a 
sign of weak confidence for the market and could lead ARM shareholders to ask for higher 
values to insure the risk of Intel shares devaluate. Issuing debt would make possible to offer 
only cash to ARM shareholders. Historically this is better accepted by target shareholders and 
could ease the process. 
The data available suggests Intel never worked with less than $4Bn in cash. To finance the 
acquisition Intel will have no trouble in issuing debt, even in the present conditions. This is so 
because Intel has maintained positive financial results for several years in a row and these 
results allow the financing of a much higher volume of debt than the one Intel has nowadays. 
Total debt at Intel amounts to a little less than $2Bn. Our proposal would be to raise $5Bn of 
additional debt. The deal could be entirely financed with cash and the resulting entity would 
end up with approximately $6Bn in cash, which is slightly above the minimum level Intel kept 
during the last years. 
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The resulting firm would have about $7Bn in debt for a total company value of $148.8Bn. 
Furthermore with a yearly net income of approximately $9Bn for the next several years, Intel 
should have no problem in keeping the proposed level of debt. 
6. Conclusions 
When I decided to write my thesis (about October 2010) about a possible acquisition of ARM 
by Intel, the hypothesis of ARM being bought by Intel or some other giant as Apple, Google or 
Samsung, among others, was very much on the table. Since then, the speculation of a possible 
takeover has decreased and right now that possibility is not so present anymore. 
The share value of ARM during all this time has fluctuated around 600p, very close to the price 
point I used to write my thesis and this value seems acceptable for the actual growth 
predictions being used. This gives me some confidence that my evaluations are credible and 
that I am not using less credible growth predictions to justify the deal. 
Also good to point is that, by now, it is completely clear that Intel decided to proceed in a 
complete different direction. Intel is right now pushing into ARM land, with tablets already 
launched and smartphones set to launch on April/May 2012. ARM is also planning to enter the 
notebook space but only in the end of 2012/beginning of 2013. 
 
  




Appendix 1: Basic Valuation Formulas 




Formula used for converting Unlevered to Levered Beta: 
 
APV Valuation with fixed level of Debt: 
   
WACC Valuation for fixed ratio of debt to equity: 
                        
ECF valuation for fixed ratio of debt to equity: 
        or              , with     
CAPM unlevered cost of equity: 
            , with   
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Appendix 2: ARM and Intel Shareholder Structure 
ARM Top 10 Shareholders 
Holder Ownership 
Capital World Investors 5,1% 
Fidelity Management & Research Company 5% 
Thornburg Investment Management, Inc. 5% 
Legal & General Investment Management Ltd. 3,8% 
Janus Capital Management, LLC 3,6% 
Artio Global Management, LLC 2,8% 
Capital Guardian Trust Company 1,7% 
SAFE Investment Company Limited 1,6% 
Calamos Advisors LLC 1,5% 
Baillie Gilford & Co 1,5% 
Subtotal 31,6% 
 
Intel Corporation Top 10 Shareholders 
Holder Ownership 
Vanguard Group, Inc. 4,1% 
State Street Corporation 4,0% 
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. 2,8% 
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 1,9% 
Invesco Ltd. 1,5% 
Northern Trust Corporation 1,3% 
Capital Research Global Investors 1,3% 
Harris Associates L.P. 1,2% 
Wellington Magagement Company, LLP 1,1% 
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Appendix 3: Predictions for Unit Sales, prices and market shares in Microprocessor 
Markets 
Estimations for Worldwide sales of Microprocessors: 
The estimations were done having RBS report on ARM and Goldman Sachs report on Intel as 
base cases. The most important facts to retain from the estimations are the huge growth of 
unit sales expected for Smartphones and tablets, which really are the support for ARM value. 
For the other side it is interesting to notice that desktops should actually experience decreased 
sales. 
Market Shares and Average Selling Prices for Intel Processors: 
Intel main revenues should continue arising from the notebook segment for a while yet. This is 
the segment where Intel sells more units nowadays and its relatively high Average Selling Price 
helps creating the major part of Intel revenues. However with huge increases in Smartphone’s 
market size and with Intel gaining market share in the future this segment may become much 
more relevant in Intel revenue mix. 
  
Worldwide Unit Sales 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 170.000.000  187.000.000  206.000.000  226.000.000  249.000.000  274.000.000  
Netbooks 37.000.000    38.000.000    39.000.000    40.000.000    42.000.000    43.000.000    
Tablets 23.000.000    52.000.000    87.000.000    116.000.000  145.000.000  174.000.000  
Desktops 150.000.000  148.000.000  146.000.000  144.000.000  142.000.000  140.000.000  
Smartphones 280.000.000  364.000.000  473.200.000  567.840.000  681.408.000  817.689.600  
CPU ASP Intel DOL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 90                      85                      85                      85                      85                      85                      
Netbooks 24                      24                      24                      23                      22                      21                      
Tablets 22                      21                      20                      19                      19                      20                      
Desktops 95                      90                      90                      90                      90                      90                      
Smartphones 17                      18                      18                      19                      19                      20                      
Intel Market Shares 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 86,0% 84,0% 82,0% 77,0% 70,0% 65,0%
Netbooks 98,0% 80,0% 70,0% 60,0% 55,0% 50,0%
Tablets 0,0% 5,0% 7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
Desktops 73,0% 70,0% 67,5% 65,0% 62,5% 60,0%
Smartphones 0,0% 5,0% 7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
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Market Shares and Average Selling Prices for ARM Processors: 
ARM major revenues should arise from Smartphone’s processors sales. Tablets are also a great 
source of revenue for ARM nowadays but should be surpassed in the future by the notebook 
segment, as Windows becomes compatible with ARM architecture and ARM starts competing 
against Intel and AMD in the low power and cheap segment. 
 
Market Shares and Average Selling Prices for the Joint Company: 
 
The acquisition of ARM by Intel is reflected here by larger market shares, either by more 
aggressive penetration of new markets (smartphones and tablets) and by higher retention 
rates in the segments where Intel dominates nowadays. Furthermore, with the exception of 
Smartphones, where Intel should be very aggressive, and the desktop segment, where the 
ARM impact should be reduced, we reviewed up the ASP for the Joint Company, being the 
most significant the increase in the notebook segment, given its high unit sales.  
ARM Market Shares 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 0,0% 1,0% 3,0% 8,0% 15,0% 20,0%
Netbooks 0,0% 5,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0% 30,0%
Tablets 96,0% 90,0% 85,0% 80,0% 75,0% 70,0%
Desktops 0,0% 0,0% 2,5% 5,0% 7,5% 10,0%
Smartphones 90,0% 90,0% 85,0% 80,0% 75,0% 70,0%
CPU ASP ARM DOL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 50                      50                      50                      50                      60                      70                      
Netbooks 25                      24                      24                      23                      22                      21                      
Tablets 22                      21                      20                      19                      18                      17                      
Desktops 50                      50                      50                      50                      60                      70                      
Smartphones 17                      18                      18                      19                      19                      20                      
JC Market Shares 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 86,0% 84,0% 82,0% 80,0% 78,0% 75,0%
Netbooks 98,0% 80,0% 75,0% 70,0% 67,5% 65,0%
Tablets 0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0%
Desktops 73,0% 70,0% 68,8% 67,5% 66,3% 65,0%
Smartphones 0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0%
JC CPU ASP DOL 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Notebooks 90                      90                      90                      90                      90                      90                      
Netbooks 24                      24                      24                      24                      24                      24                      
Tablets 22                      22                      22                      22                      22                      22                      
Desktops 95                      90                      90                      90                      90                      90                      
Smartphones 17                      18                      18                      19                      19                      20                      
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Appendix 4: Intel DCF Valuation and Balance Sheet 
Intel Income Statement, Cash Flow and Valuation: 
 
  
Intel FCFF 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Revenue 35.127.000.000          43.623.000.000          44.694.223.920            47.482.253.321          49.997.392.386          52.497.911.854          55.853.668.996            
PC Client Group 26.175.000.000          31.598.000.000          31.232.047.920            32.429.599.529          33.100.695.885          33.502.831.507          34.279.261.605            
Microprocessor 19.914.000.000          24.721.000.000          23.722.363.920            24.229.024.601          24.145.668.064          23.723.941.126          23.600.713.309            
Unit Estimations 24.430.740.000          23.405.400.000            23.882.900.000          23.767.700.000          23.311.200.000          23.150.000.000            
Growth Rate 290.260.000                316.963.920                  346.124.601                377.968.064                412.741.126                450.713.309                  
Chipset, Motherboard and other 6.261.000.000            6.877.000.000            7.509.684.000               8.200.574.928            8.955.027.821            9.778.890.381            10.678.548.296            
Data Center Group 6.450.000.000            8.693.000.000            9.492.756.000               10.366.089.552          11.319.769.791          12.361.188.612          13.498.417.964            
Microprocessor 5.301.000.000            7.361.000.000            8.038.212.000               8.777.727.504            9.585.278.434            10.467.124.050          11.430.099.463            
Chipset, Motherboard and other 1.149.000.000            1.332.000.000            1.454.544.000               1.588.362.048            1.734.491.356            1.894.064.561            2.068.318.501              
Other Intel Architecture Operating Segments 1.402.000.000            1.784.000.000            2.330.328.000               2.896.675.776            3.622.368.507            4.499.514.178            5.745.249.134              
Unit Estimations -                                  382.200.000                  769.320.000                1.299.296.000            1.962.719.000            2.975.068.800              
Growth Rate 1.784.000.000            1.948.128.000               2.127.355.776            2.323.072.507            2.536.795.178            2.770.180.334              
Other Revenue 970.000.000                1.501.000.000            1.639.092.000               1.789.888.464            1.954.558.203            2.134.377.557            2.330.740.293              
Corporate 130.000.000                47.000.000                  -                                     -                                  -                                  -                                  -                                    
Cost of Sales 15.566.000.000          15.132.000.000          17.430.747.329            19.467.723.861          21.498.878.726          23.624.060.334          25.692.687.738            
Gross Margin 19.561.000.000          28.491.000.000          27.263.476.591            28.014.529.459          28.498.513.660          28.873.851.520          30.160.981.258            
Gross Margin (%) 56% 65% 61% 59% 57% 55% 54%
Operating Expenses 13.850.000.000          12.903.000.000          15.798.018.066            16.563.885.609          17.521.184.837          18.424.149.568          19.469.726.982            
R&D 5.653.000.000            6.576.000.000            8.200.000.000               8.491.902.545            9.021.628.131            9.499.504.553            9.974.603.252              
Marketing, General and Administrative 7.931.000.000            6.309.000.000            7.598.018.066               8.071.983.065            8.499.556.706            8.924.645.015            9.495.123.729              
Restructuring and Impairment Charges 231.000.000                -                                  -                                     -                                  -                                  -                                  -                                    
Amortization and Impairment of intangibles and Costs35.000.000                 18.000.000                  -                                     -                                  -                                  -                                  -                                    
Operating Income 5.711.000.000            15.588.000.000          11.465.458.525            11.450.643.850          10.977.328.824          10.449.701.951          10.691.254.276            
Gains on Equity Securities, net 170.000.000 -               348.000.000                348.000.000                  348.000.000                348.000.000                348.000.000                348.000.000                  
Interest and Other, net 163.000.000                109.000.000                109.000.000                  109.000.000                109.000.000                109.000.000                109.000.000                  
Income Before Taxes 5.704.000.000            16.045.000.000          11.922.458.525            11.907.643.850          11.434.328.824          10.906.701.951          11.148.254.276            
Operating Margin 16% 37% 27% 25% 23% 21% 20%
Provision for Taxes 1.335.000.000            4.581.000.000            3.457.512.972               3.453.216.716            3.315.955.359            3.162.943.566            3.232.993.740              
Net Income 4.369.000.000            11.464.000.000          8.464.945.553               8.454.427.133            8.118.373.465            7.743.758.385            7.915.260.536              
Profit Margin 12% 26% 19% 18% 16% 15% 14%
Dep & Amort 4.744.000.000            4.398.000.000            5.005.858.981               5.239.101.275            5.368.952.459            5.531.009.515            6.000.000.000              
Other Losses, Impairments and Provisions 1.997.000.000            765.000.000                782.148.919                  830.939.433                874.954.367                918.713.457                977.439.207                  
Changes WC 60.000.000                  65.000.000                  364.917.285 -                 107.439.532                297.271.798                299.126.619                87.569.669                    
Cash from Operating Activities 11.170.000.000          16.692.000.000          13.888.036.167            14.631.907.373          14.659.552.088          14.492.607.977          14.980.269.413            
CAPEX 7.965.000.000 -           10.539.000.000 -         8.403.514.326 -              7.830.682.315 -           6.811.743.394 -           7.331.643.471 -           6.000.000.000 -             
Other -                                  -                                  -                                     -                                  -                                  -                                  -                                    
FCFF 3.205.000.000            6.153.000.000            5.484.521.841               6.801.225.059            7.847.808.694            7.160.964.506            8.980.269.413              
Terminal Value 162.620.655.550          
Discounted Values 5.030.645.927               5.722.121.939            6.056.243.817            5.068.873.412            105.584.608.248          
Company Value Company Value 127.462.493.344          Devt Value 2.393.000.000            Equity Value 125.069.493.344          
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Intel Balance Sheet: 
 
  
Intel Balance Sheet 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cash &amp; Equivalents 3.987.000.000       5.498.000.000       5.498.000.000       5.498.000.000       5.498.000.000       5.498.000.000       5.498.000.000       
Short Term Investments 9.933.000.000       16.387.000.000    16.387.000.000    16.387.000.000    16.387.000.000    16.387.000.000    16.387.000.000    
Cash and Short Term Investments 13.920.000.000  21.885.000.000  21.885.000.000  21.885.000.000  21.885.000.000  21.885.000.000  21.885.000.000  
Accounts Receivable - Trade, Gross 2.292.000.000       2.895.000.000       2.681.653.435       2.848.935.199       2.999.843.543       3.149.874.711       3.351.220.140       
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 19.000.000 -        28.000.000 -        26.816.534 -             28.489.352 -             29.998.435 -             31.498.747 -             33.512.201 -             
Trade Accounts Receivable - Net 2.273.000.000       2.867.000.000       2.654.836.901       2.820.445.847       2.969.845.108       3.118.375.964       3.317.707.938       
Total Receivables, Net 2.273.000.000    2.867.000.000    2.654.836.901    2.820.445.847    2.969.845.108    3.118.375.964    3.317.707.938    
Inventories - Finished Goods 1.029.000.000       1.399.000.000       1.787.768.957    1.899.290.133    1.999.895.695    2.099.916.474    2.234.146.760    
Inventories - Work In Progress 1.469.000.000       1.887.000.000       2.011.240.076       2.136.701.399       2.249.882.657       2.362.406.033       2.513.415.105       
Inventories - Raw Materials 437.000.000           471.000.000           670.413.359           712.233.800           749.960.886           787.468.678           837.805.035           
Total Inventory 2.935.000.000    3.757.000.000    4.469.422.392    4.748.225.332    4.999.739.239    5.249.791.185    5.585.366.900    
Deferred Income Tax - Current Asset 1.216.000.000       1.488.000.000       1.728.756.486       1.726.608.358       1.657.977.679       1.581.471.783       1.616.496.870       
Other Current Assets 813.000.000           1.614.000.000       1.340.826.718       1.424.467.600       1.499.921.772       1.574.937.356       1.675.610.070       
Other Current Assets, Total 2.029.000.000    3.102.000.000    3.069.583.204    3.151.075.958    3.157.899.451    3.156.409.139    3.292.106.940    
Total Current Assets 21.157.000.000  31.611.000.000  32.078.842.497  32.604.747.137  33.012.483.797  33.409.576.288  34.080.181.778  
Land/Improvements 16.687.000.000    17.421.000.000    17.430.747.329    18.518.078.795    18.999.009.107    19.949.206.504    20.665.857.529    
Machinery/Equipment 28.339.000.000    30.421.000.000    33.744.139.060    35.136.867.457    35.998.122.518    36.748.538.298    38.539.031.607    
Construction in Progress 2.796.000.000       2.639.000.000       2.658.000.000       2.658.000.000       2.658.000.000       2.658.000.000       2.658.000.000       
Property/Plant/Equipment - Gross 47.822.000.000    50.481.000.000    53.832.886.388    56.312.946.252    57.655.131.625    59.355.744.802    61.862.889.136    
Accumulated Depreciation 30.597.000.000 - 32.582.000.000 - 34.453.047.289 - 36.040.285.601 - 36.899.284.240 - 37.987.676.673 - 39.592.249.047 - 
Property/Plant/Equipment - Net 17.225.000.000  17.899.000.000  19.379.839.100  20.272.660.651  20.755.847.385  21.368.068.129  22.270.640.089  
Goodw ill, Net 4.421.000.000    4.531.000.000    4.916.364.631       5.223.047.865       5.499.713.162       5.774.770.304       6.143.903.590       
Intangibles - Gross 1.865.000.000       1.742.000.000       1.787.768.957       1.899.290.133       1.999.895.695       2.099.916.474       2.234.146.760       
Accumulated Intangible Amortization 982.000.000 -      882.000.000 -      1.042.899.206 -   1.213.835.318 -   1.393.825.931 -   1.582.818.413 -   1.783.891.622 -   
Intangibles, Net 883.000.000       860.000.000       744.869.751       685.454.815       606.069.765       517.098.061       450.255.138       
LT Investment - Affiliate Companies 3.411.000.000       2.663.000.000       2.663.000.000       2.663.000.000       2.663.000.000       2.663.000.000       2.663.000.000       
LT Investments - Other 4.952.000.000       4.034.000.000       4.034.000.000       4.034.000.000       4.034.000.000       4.034.000.000       4.034.000.000       
Long Term Investments 8.363.000.000    6.697.000.000    6.697.000.000    6.697.000.000    6.697.000.000    6.697.000.000    6.697.000.000    
Note Receivable - Long Term 249.000.000           741.000.000           741.000.000           741.000.000           741.000.000           741.000.000           741.000.000           
Deferred Income Tax - Long Term Asset 278.000.000           289.000.000           289.000.000           289.000.000           289.000.000           289.000.000           289.000.000           
Other Long Term Assets 519.000.000           558.000.000           558.000.000           558.000.000           558.000.000           558.000.000           558.000.000           
Other Long Term Assets, Total 797.000.000       847.000.000       847.000.000       847.000.000       847.000.000       847.000.000       847.000.000       
Total Assets 53.095.000.000  63.186.000.000  65.404.915.978  67.070.910.468  68.159.114.110  69.354.512.781  71.229.980.595  
Accounts Payable 1.883.000.000       2.290.000.000       2.440.304.626       2.725.481.341       3.009.843.022       3.307.368.447       3.596.976.283       
Accrued Expenses 4.857.000.000       6.377.000.000       6.319.207.227       6.625.554.244       7.008.473.935       7.369.659.827       7.787.890.793       
Notes Payable/Short Term Debt 172.000.000           38.000.000              -                                   -                                   -                                   -                                   -                                   
Customer Advances 593.000.000           622.000.000           670.413.359           712.233.800           749.960.886           787.468.678           837.805.035           
Income Taxes Payable 86.000.000              -                                   -                                   -                                   -                                   -                                   -                                   
Other Current liabilities, Total 679.000.000       622.000.000       670.413.359       712.233.800       749.960.886       787.468.678       837.805.035       
Total Current Liabilities 7.591.000.000    9.327.000.000    9.429.925.211    10.063.269.384  10.768.277.842  11.464.496.952  12.222.672.111  
Long Term Debt 2.049.000.000       2.077.000.000       1.962.147.479       2.012.127.314       2.044.773.423       2.080.635.383       2.136.899.418       
Total Long Term Debt 2.049.000.000    2.077.000.000    1.962.147.479    2.012.127.314    2.044.773.423    2.080.635.383    2.136.899.418    
Total Debt 2.221.000.000    2.115.000.000    1.962.147.479    2.012.127.314    2.044.773.423    2.080.635.383    2.136.899.418    
Deferred Income Tax - LT Liability 555.000.000           926.000.000           691.502.594           690.643.343           663.191.072           632.588.713           646.598.748           
Deferred Income Tax 555.000.000       926.000.000       691.502.594       690.643.343       663.191.072       632.588.713       646.598.748       
Other Long Term Liabilities 1.196.000.000       1.426.000.000       1.895.762.168       1.987.666.273       2.102.542.180       2.210.897.948       2.336.367.238       
Other Liabilities, Total 1.196.000.000    1.426.000.000    1.895.762.168    1.987.666.273    2.102.542.180    2.210.897.948    2.336.367.238    
Total Liabilities 11.391.000.000  13.756.000.000  13.979.337.453  14.753.706.315  15.578.784.518  16.388.618.997  17.342.537.515  
Common Stock 14.993.000.000    16.178.000.000    18.173.578.525    19.065.204.153    19.328.329.592    19.713.893.785    20.635.443.080    
Common Stock 14.993.000.000  16.178.000.000  18.173.578.525  19.065.204.153  19.328.329.592  19.713.893.785  20.635.443.080  
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 26.318.000.000    32.919.000.000    32.919.000.000    32.919.000.000    32.919.000.000    32.919.000.000    32.919.000.000    
Other Comprehensive Income 393.000.000           333.000.000           333.000.000           333.000.000           333.000.000           333.000.000           333.000.000           
Other Equity, Total 393.000.000       333.000.000       333.000.000       333.000.000       333.000.000       333.000.000       333.000.000       
Total Equity 41.704.000.000  49.430.000.000  51.425.578.525  52.317.204.153  52.580.329.592  52.965.893.785  53.887.443.080  
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity 53.095.000.000  63.186.000.000  65.404.915.978  67.070.910.468  68.159.114.110  69.354.512.781  71.229.980.595  
PredictionsActual Values
62  M&A: ARM takeover by Intel 
  
 
Appendix 5: ARM DCF Valuation and Balance Sheet 




ARM FCFF 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues (USD) 489.500.000            631.300.000            730.112.941            840.675.712            963.325.526            1.107.276.185         1.288.858.741         
Licensing 164.100.000            208.200.000            227.354.400            248.271.005            271.111.937            296.054.235            323.291.225            
Royalties 244.300.000            335.300.000            406.880.941            487.706.368            577.883.002            686.372.949            829.232.407            
Unit Estimations 91.509.120               140.661.300            196.994.520            260.425.664            339.709.536            450.675.960            
Growth Rate 243.790.880            266.219.641            290.711.848            317.457.338            346.663.413            378.556.447            
Other 81.100.000               87.800.000               95.877.600               104.698.339            114.330.586            124.849.000            136.335.108            
Exchange Rate GBP/USD 1,60                            1,55                            1,66                            1,65                            1,64                            1,64                            1,65                            
Revenues (GBP) 305.000.000            406.600.000            438.928.824            509.106.632            586.070.091            676.714.923            780.187.937            
Licensing 98.500.000               132.500.000            136.680.771            150.350.978            164.939.674            180.934.370            195.698.649            
Royalties 155.400.000            217.700.000            244.608.420            295.351.160            351.573.725            419.478.738            501.961.232            
Other 51.100.000               56.400.000               57.639.633               63.404.495               69.556.692               76.301.814               82.528.056               
Total Costs of Revenues 25.471.000               26.071.000               35.537.000               39.091.254               42.884.315               47.042.936               50.881.649               
Product Costs 16.645.000               26.071.000               25.969.346               28.566.686               31.338.538               34.377.530               37.182.743               
Service Costs 8.826.000                 -                               9.567.654                 10.524.568               11.545.777               12.665.406               13.698.905               
Gross Profit 279.529.000            380.529.000            403.391.823            470.015.378            543.185.776            629.671.986            729.306.288            
Gross Margin (%) 92% 94% 92% 92% 93% 93% 93%
Total Operating Expenses 233.937.000            273.565.000            267.894.310            294.687.916            323.281.760            354.631.365            383.569.351            
R&D 112.215.000            139.750.000            123.012.694            135.315.880            148.445.706            162.840.933            176.128.784            
Sales and Marketing 61.723.000               70.108.000               73.807.616               81.189.528               89.067.424               97.704.560               105.677.270            
General and Administrative 59.999.000               63.707.000               71.074.001               78.182.508               85.768.630               94.085.872               101.763.297            
Profit on Disposal of Available-for-Sale Investment -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               
Profit From Operations 45.592.000               106.964.000            135.497.513            175.327.462            219.904.016            275.040.621            345.736.937            
Investment Income 1.788.000              3.634.000              3.634.000              3.634.000              3.634.000              3.634.000              3.634.000              
Interest Payable 143.000 -                 566.000 -                 -                            -                            -                            -                            -                            
Income Before Taxes 47.237.000               110.032.000            139.131.513            178.961.462            223.538.016            278.674.621            349.370.937            
Net Margin 15% 27% 32% 35% 38% 41% 45%
Taxes 6.820.000                 24.053.000               31.414.874               41.553.801               52.932.979               67.100.101               85.523.714               
Net Income 40.417.000               85.979.000               107.716.639            137.407.661            170.605.037            211.574.520            263.847.223            
Dep & Amort 24.953.000               19.949.000               21.518.720               23.242.658               25.245.543               27.237.434               40.000.000               
Other Losses, Impairments and Provisions 11.401.000               27.076.000               27.336.154               30.070.196               32.987.935               36.186.874               39.139.730               
Changes WC 30.142.000               45.807.000               12.825.977 -              7.649.607                 8.485.577                 10.277.551               12.566.413               
Cash from Operating Activities 113.733.000            202.864.000            175.160.409            239.923.923            290.257.070            352.376.479            441.077.080            
Tax 6.820.000 -                24.053.000 -              31.414.874 -              41.553.801 -              52.932.979 -              67.100.101 -              85.523.714 -              
CAPEX 122.510.000 -           153.264.000 -           36.466.827 -              46.345.735 -              51.542.098 -              53.669.977 -              40.000.000 -              
Other -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               -                               
FCFF 15.597.000 -              25.547.000               107.278.709            152.024.387            185.781.993            231.606.401            315.553.366            
Terminal Value 8.808.549.125         
Discounted Values 99.717.756               131.350.334            149.204.010            172.896.577            6.575.673.148         
Company Value Equity Value GBP 7.128.841.824         Equity Value DOL 11.910.156.036      
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ARM Balance Sheet:  
ARM Balance Sheet GBP 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cash 32.489.000              29.363.000              29.363.000              29.363.000              29.363.000              29.363.000              29.363.000              
Short Term Investments 109.319.000           247.466.000           247.466.000           247.466.000           247.466.000           247.466.000           247.466.000           
Cash and Short Term Investments 141.808.000      276.829.000      276.829.000           276.829.000           276.829.000           276.829.000           276.829.000           
Accounts Receivable - Trade, Gross 55.289.000              99.068.000              83.396.477              96.730.260              111.353.317           128.575.835           148.235.708           
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 2.395.000 -         2.091.000 -         3.335.859 -               3.869.210 -               4.454.133 -               5.143.033 -               5.929.428 -               
Trade Accounts Receivable - Net 52.894.000              96.977.000              80.060.617              92.861.050              106.899.185           123.432.802           142.306.280           
Other Receivables 21.767.000              14.659.000              36.027.278              41.787.472              48.104.633              55.544.761              64.037.826              
Total Receivables, Net 74.661.000        111.636.000      116.087.895      134.648.522      155.003.818      178.977.563      206.344.106      
Inventories - Finished Goods 2.138.000                2.043.000                2.733.615                3.007.020                3.298.793                3.618.687                3.913.973                
Inventories - Other 458.000 -            259.000 -            328.034 -                   360.842 -                   395.855 -                   434.242 -                   469.677 -                   
Total Inventory 1.680.000          1.784.000          2.405.582          2.646.177          2.902.938          3.184.445          3.444.296          
Prepaid Expenses 14.221.000              12.463.000              15.280.910              16.809.239              18.440.256              20.228.463              21.879.109              
Other Current Assets 3.287.000                5.949.000                8.778.576                10.182.133              11.721.402              13.534.298              15.603.759              
Other Current Assets, Total 3.287.000          5.949.000          8.778.576          10.182.133        11.721.402        13.534.298        15.603.759        
Total Current Assets 235.657.000      408.661.000      419.381.964           441.115.071           464.897.413           492.753.769           524.100.269           
Buildings 20.899.000              17.873.000              23.235.731              24.056.156              26.390.348              27.140.156              29.354.797              
Machinery/Equipment 27.364.000              31.252.000              32.803.385              34.580.725              36.286.728              37.996.218              39.139.730              
Construction in Progress -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Property/Plant/Equipment - Gross 48.263.000              49.125.000              56.039.116              58.636.881              62.677.076        65.136.373              68.494.527              
Accumulated Depreciation 34.698.000 -       35.278.000 -       40.348.163 -       42.218.555 -       45.127.495 -       46.898.189 -       49.316.059 -       
Property/Plant/Equipment - Net 13.565.000        13.847.000        15.690.952        16.418.327        17.549.581        18.238.185        19.178.468        
Goodwill, Net 516.798.000      532.285.000      715.453.983           829.843.811           955.294.249           1.103.045.324        1.271.706.337        
Intangibles - Gross 154.091.000           156.718.000           159.148.080           173.789.703           189.778.356           207.237.965           226.303.858           
Accumulated Intangible Amortization 129.395.000 -     144.619.000 -     160.533.808 -     177.912.778 -     196.890.614 -     217.614.410 -     240.244.796 -     
Intangibles, Net 24.696.000        12.099.000        1.385.728 -         4.123.075 -         7.112.258 -         10.376.446 -       13.940.939 -       
LT Investments - Other 9.432.000                20.329.000              20.329.000              20.329.000              20.329.000              20.329.000              20.329.000              
Long Term Investments 9.432.000          20.329.000        20.329.000        20.329.000        20.329.000        20.329.000        20.329.000        
Note Receivable - Long Term -                              1.934.000                1.934.000                1.934.000                1.934.000                1.934.000                1.934.000                
Deferred Income Tax - Long Term Asset 42.724.000              78.587.000              78.587.000              78.587.000              78.587.000              78.587.000              78.587.000              
Other Long Term Assets 1.611.000                16.920.000              16.920.000              16.920.000              16.920.000              16.920.000              16.920.000              
Other Long Term Assets, Total 44.335.000        95.507.000        95.507.000        95.507.000        95.507.000        95.507.000        95.507.000        
Total Assets 844.483.000      1.084.662.000   1.266.911.171   1.401.024.134   1.548.398.986   1.721.430.831   1.918.814.135   
Accounts Payable 2.280.000                4.305.000                4.264.440                4.690.951                5.146.118                5.645.152                6.105.798                
Accrued Expenses 42.727.000              68.003.000              45.542.033              50.096.946              54.957.899              60.287.332              65.206.790              
Notes Payable/Short Term Debt -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Customer Advances 39.562.000              72.049.000              74.617.900              86.548.127              99.631.916              115.041.537           132.631.949           
Income Taxes Payable 16.536.000              20.216.000              31.414.874              41.553.801              52.932.979              67.100.101              85.523.714              
Other Payables 3.961.000                4.025.000                8.036.829                8.840.637                9.698.453                10.638.941              11.507.081              
Other Current Liabilities -                              201.000                    -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Other Current liabilities, Total 60.059.000        96.491.000        114.069.603           136.942.566           162.263.347           192.780.579           229.662.743           
Total Current Liabilities 105.066.000      168.799.000      163.876.076           191.730.462           222.367.364        258.713.063           300.975.331           
Total Long Term Debt -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      
Total Debt -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      
Deferred Income Tax - LT Liability 720.000                    301.000                    -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Deferred Income Tax 720.000             301.000             -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      
Other Long Term Liabilities -                              20.657.000              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Other Liabilities, Total -                      20.657.000        -                      -                      -                      -                      -                      
Total Liabilities 105.786.000      189.757.000      163.876.076      191.730.462      222.367.364      258.713.063      300.975.331      
Common Stock 672.000                    672.000                    172.335.268           232.248.109           297.443.961           380.460.130           495.581.166           
Common Stock 672.000             672.000             172.335.268      232.248.109      297.443.961      380.460.130      495.581.166      
Additional Paid-In Capital 351.578.000           351.578.000           351.578.000           351.578.000           351.578.000           351.578.000           351.578.000           
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 303.424.000           442.853.000           479.319.827           525.665.562           577.207.661           630.877.638           670.877.638           
Unrealized Gain (Loss) 155.000 -            -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              -                              
Translation Adjustment 83.178.000              99.802.000              99.802.000              99.802.000              99.802.000              99.802.000              99.802.000              
Other Equity, Total 83.178.000        99.802.000        99.802.000        99.802.000        99.802.000        99.802.000        99.802.000        
Total Equity 738.697.000      894.905.000      1.103.035.095        1.209.293.672        1.326.031.621   1.462.717.768        1.617.838.804        
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity 844.483.000      1.084.662.000   1.266.911.171   1.401.024.134   1.548.398.986   1.721.430.831   1.918.814.135   
PredictionsActual Values
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Appendix 6: Intel and ARM Multiples Valuation 
Intel Multiples Control Group: 
 
ARM Multiples Control Group: 
  
Company Name Sales DOL (mil)Pre-Tax Profit DOL (mil)Market Value DOL (mil) P/Sales P/E
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 6.494,0 971,0 5.440,1 0,84    5,60    
International Business Machines Corp. 100.012,5 19.751,1 189.074,3 1,89    9,57    
Oracle Corporation 25.350,5 7.791,4 158.937,6 6,27    20,40  
QUALCOMM, Inc. 10.757,4 3.948,3 89.233,9 8,30    22,60  
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 134.054,0 16.756,6 124.695,7 0,93    7,44    
SONY CORPORATION 84.282,3 2.406,1 25.058,0 0,30    10,41  
TOSHIBA CORPORATION 75.095,4 2.295,0 20.485,5 0,27    8,93    
Microsoft 62.484,0 18.760,0 238.784,5 3,82    12,73  
Average 2,83    12,21  
Company Name Sales DOL (mil)Pre-Tax Profit DOL (mil)Market Value DOL (mil) P/Sales P/E
ARM Holdings plc 629,5              170,3              11.818,1          18,78  69,38  
Atheros Communications, Inc. 928,2              66,1                3.130,2            3,37    47,38  
Broadcom Corporation 6.828,0            1.098,9            17.965,5          2,63    16,35  
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. 10.488,7          2.337,4            15.957,0          1,52    6,83    
MediaTek Inc. 3.610,6            1.026,9            11.008,9          3,05    10,72  
Micron Technology, Inc. 8.240,2            1.865,3            9.352,1            1,13    5,01    
NVIDIA Corporation 3.568,5            273,1              10.815,5          3,03    39,60  
SanDisk Corporation 4.835,5            1.460,1            10.228,0          2,12    7,01    
Silicon Integrated Systems Corp. 84,0                5,4                  320,6              3,82    58,93  
STMicroelectronics N.V. 10.360,8          692,0              6.660,1            0,64    9,62    
Texas Instruments Incorporated 13.985,9          4.557,5            37.573,1          2,69    8,24    
Average 3,89    25,37  
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Appendix 7: Joint Company DCF Valuation and Balance Sheet 
Joint Company Income Statement, Cash Flow and Valuation: 
  
Joint Company FCFF 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Net Revenue 35.127.000.000            43.623.000.000            45.482.223.920            48.811.743.321            52.623.540.386            57.078.293.254            62.129.848.196            
PC Client Group 26.175.000.000            31.598.000.000            32.017.447.920            33.485.249.529            35.024.995.885            36.818.581.507            38.485.061.605            
Microprocessor 19.914.000.000            24.721.000.000            24.507.763.920            25.284.674.601            26.069.968.064            27.039.691.126            27.806.513.309            
Unit Estimations 24.430.740.000            24.190.800.000            24.938.550.000            25.692.000.000            26.626.950.000            27.355.800.000            
Growth Rate 290.260.000                  316.963.920                  346.124.601                  377.968.064                  412.741.126                  450.713.309                  
Chipset, Motherboard and other 6.261.000.000               6.877.000.000               7.509.684.000               8.200.574.928               8.955.027.821               9.778.890.381               10.678.548.296            
Data Center Group 6.450.000.000               8.693.000.000               9.492.756.000               10.366.089.552            11.319.769.791            12.361.188.612            13.498.417.964            
Microprocessor 5.301.000.000               7.361.000.000               8.038.212.000               8.777.727.504               9.585.278.434               10.467.124.050            11.430.099.463            
Chipset, Motherboard and other 1.149.000.000               1.332.000.000               1.454.544.000               1.588.362.048               1.734.491.356               1.894.064.561               2.068.318.501               
Other Intel Architecture Operating Segments 1.402.000.000               1.784.000.000               2.332.928.000               3.170.515.776               4.324.216.507               5.764.145.578               7.815.628.334               
Unit Estimations -                                     384.800.000                  1.043.160.000               2.001.144.000               3.227.350.400               5.045.448.000               
Growth Rate 1.784.000.000               1.948.128.000               2.127.355.776               2.323.072.507               2.536.795.178               2.770.180.334               
Other Revenue 970.000.000                  1.501.000.000               1.639.092.000               1.789.888.464               1.954.558.203               2.134.377.557               2.330.740.293               
Corporate 130.000.000                  47.000.000                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     
Cost of Sales 15.566.000.000            15.132.000.000            17.738.067.329            20.012.814.761            22.101.886.962            25.114.449.032            27.958.431.688            
Gross Margin 19.561.000.000            28.491.000.000            27.744.156.591            28.798.928.559            30.521.653.424            31.963.844.222            34.171.416.508            
Gross Margin (%) 56% 65% 61% 59% 58% 56% 55%
Operating Expenses 14.216.204.980            13.325.876.777            16.397.592.690            16.470.793.784            17.651.688.300            18.994.214.903            20.556.346.149            
R&D 5.828.661.361               6.792.025.550               8.404.618.960               7.955.421.971               8.541.997.108               9.212.450.678               9.994.271.956               
Marketing, General and Administrative 8.121.543.619               6.515.851.227               7.972.973.730               8.495.371.813               9.089.691.192               9.781.764.226               10.562.074.193            
Restructuring and Impairment Charges 231.000.000                  -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     
Amortization and Impairment of intangibles and Costs 35.000.000                     18.000.000                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     -                                     
Integration Costs 20.000.000                     20.000.000                     20.000.000                     
Operating Income 5.344.795.020               15.165.123.223            11.346.563.901            12.328.134.775            12.869.965.124            12.969.629.319            13.615.070.359            
Gains on Equity Securities, net 170.000.000 -                 348.000.000                  348.000.000                  348.000.000                  348.000.000                  348.000.000                  348.000.000                  
Interest and Other, net 163.000.000                  109.000.000                  109.000.000                  109.000.000                  109.000.000                  109.000.000                  109.000.000                  
Income Before Taxes 5.337.795.020               15.622.123.223            11.803.563.901            12.785.134.775            13.326.965.124            13.426.629.319            14.072.070.359            
Operating Margin 15% 36% 26% 26% 25% 24% 23%
Provision for Taxes 1.335.000.000               4.581.000.000               3.423.033.531               3.707.689.085               3.864.819.886               3.893.722.502               4.080.900.404               
Net Income 4.002.795.020               11.041.123.223            8.380.530.370               9.077.445.690               9.462.145.238               9.532.906.816               9.991.169.955               
Profit Margin 11% 25% 18% 19% 18% 17% 16%
Dep & Amort 4.744.000.000               4.398.000.000               5.088.189.181               5.377.386.572               5.636.685.244               5.991.001.960               7.000.000.000               
Other Losses, Impairments and Provisions 1.997.000.000               765.000.000                  795.938.919                  854.205.508                  920.911.957                  998.870.132                  1.087.272.343               
Changes WC 60.000.000                     65.000.000                     259.393.704 -                 375.250.882 -                 21.485.106                     167.409.122                  48.429.938                     
Cash from Operating Activities 10.803.795.020            16.269.123.223            14.005.264.766            14.933.786.888            16.041.227.544            16.690.188.031            18.126.872.236            
CAPEX 7.965.000.000 -              10.539.000.000 -           9.082.432.417 -              8.590.690.912 -              8.517.781.599 -              9.927.854.364 -              7.000.000.000 -              
FCFF 2.838.795.020               5.730.123.223               4.922.832.349               6.343.095.976               7.523.445.945               6.762.333.667               11.126.872.236            
Terminal Value 201.492.758.632          
Discounted Values 4.514.824.439               5.335.227.287               5.803.557.202               4.784.095.955               130.734.000.262          
Company Value Company Value 151.171.705.145          Debt Value 2.393.000.000               Equity Value 148.778.705.145          
Actual Values Predictions
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Joint Company Balance Sheet: 
  
Intel Balance Sheet 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cash &amp; Equivalents 4.037.858.281           5.543.389.325           5.543.389.325           5.543.389.325           5.543.389.325           5.543.389.325           5.543.389.325           
Short Term Investments 10.104.127.963        16.769.532.943        16.769.532.943        16.769.532.943        16.769.532.943        16.769.532.943        16.769.532.943        
Cash and Short Term Investments 14.141.986.243     22.312.922.268     22.312.922.268     22.312.922.268     22.312.922.268     22.312.922.268     22.312.922.268     
Accounts Receivable - Trade, Gross 2.412.623.462           3.070.799.197           2.728.933.435           2.928.704.599           3.157.412.423           3.424.697.595           3.727.790.892           
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 22.749.133 -                  31.232.268 -                  27.289.334 -                  29.287.046 -                  31.574.124 -                  34.246.976 -                  37.277.909 -                  
Trade Accounts Receivable - Net 2.389.874.329           3.039.566.929           2.701.644.101           2.899.417.553           3.125.838.299           3.390.450.619           3.690.512.983           
Total Receivables, Net 2.389.874.329       3.039.566.929       2.701.644.101       2.899.417.553       3.125.838.299       3.390.450.619       3.690.512.983       
Inventories - Finished Goods 1.032.346.825           1.402.158.069           1.819.288.957       1.952.469.733       2.104.941.615       2.283.131.730       2.485.193.928       
Inventories - Work In Progress 1.468.283.047           1.886.599.638           2.046.700.076           2.196.528.449           2.368.059.317           2.568.523.196           2.795.843.169           
Inventories - Raw Materials 437.000.000                471.000.000                682.233.359                732.176.150                789.353.106                856.174.399                931.947.723                
Total Inventory 2.937.629.872       3.759.757.707       4.548.222.392       4.881.174.332       5.262.354.039       5.707.829.325       6.212.984.820       
Deferred Income Tax - Current Asset 1.238.261.553           1.507.265.305           1.711.516.766           1.853.844.542           1.932.409.943           1.946.861.251           2.040.450.202           
Other Current Assets 818.145.470                1.623.195.964           1.364.466.718           1.464.352.300           1.578.706.212           1.712.348.798           1.863.895.446           
Other Current Assets, Total 2.056.407.023       3.130.461.270       3.075.983.483       3.318.196.842       3.511.116.154       3.659.210.049       3.904.345.648       
Total Current Assets 21.525.897.468     32.242.708.174     32.638.772.244     33.411.710.996     34.212.230.760     35.070.412.262     36.120.765.719     
Land/Improvements 16.719.715.295        17.448.628.083        17.738.067.329        19.036.579.895        19.996.945.347        21.689.751.436        22.988.043.833        
Machinery/Equipment 28.381.835.606        30.469.309.342        34.339.079.060        36.120.690.057        37.888.949.078        39.954.805.278        42.869.595.255        
Construction in Progress 2.796.000.000           2.639.000.000           2.639.000.000           2.639.000.000           2.639.000.000           2.639.000.000           2.639.000.000           
Property/Plant/Equipment - Gross 47.897.550.900        50.556.937.425        54.716.146.388        57.796.269.952        60.524.894.425        64.283.556.714        68.496.639.088        
Accumulated Depreciation 30.651.316.249 -    32.636.532.732 -    35.018.333.689 -    36.989.612.769 -    38.735.932.432 -    41.141.476.297 -    43.837.849.016 -    
Property/Plant/Equipment - Net 17.246.234.651     17.920.404.693     19.697.812.700     20.806.657.183     21.788.961.993     23.142.080.417     24.658.790.072     
Goodw ill, Net 5.229.995.589       5.353.806.153       5.003.044.631           5.369.291.765           5.788.589.442           6.278.612.258           6.834.283.302           
Intangibles - Gross 2.106.214.051           1.984.254.684           1.819.288.957           1.952.469.733           2.104.941.615           2.283.131.730           2.485.193.928           
Accumulated Intangible Amortization 1.184.554.933 -      1.105.552.050 -      1.269.288.056 -      1.445.010.332 -      1.634.455.078 -      1.839.936.933 -      2.063.604.387 -      
Intangibles, Net 921.659.118          878.702.634          550.000.900          507.459.401          470.486.538          443.194.797          421.589.541          
LT Investment - Affiliate Companies 3.411.000.000           2.663.000.000           2.663.000.000           2.663.000.000           2.663.000.000           2.663.000.000           2.663.000.000           
LT Investments - Other 4.966.764.853           4.065.424.568           4.065.424.568           4.065.424.568           4.065.424.568           4.065.424.568           4.065.424.568           
Long Term Investments 8.377.764.853       6.728.424.568       6.728.424.568       6.728.424.568       6.728.424.568       6.728.424.568       6.728.424.568       
Note Receivable - Long Term 249.000.000                743.989.577                743.989.577                743.989.577                743.989.577                743.989.577                743.989.577                
Deferred Income Tax - Long Term Asset 344.880.150                410.479.785                410.479.785                410.479.785                410.479.785                410.479.785                410.479.785                
Other Long Term Assets 521.521.859                584.154.936                584.154.936                584.154.936                584.154.936                584.154.936                584.154.936                
Other Long Term Assets, Total 866.402.009          994.634.721          994.634.721          994.634.721          994.634.721          994.634.721          994.634.721          
Total Assets 54.416.953.688     64.862.670.520     66.356.679.342     68.562.168.210     70.727.317.599     73.401.348.599     76.502.477.499     
Accounts Payable 1.886.569.112           2.296.654.669           2.483.329.426           2.801.794.067           3.094.264.175           3.516.022.864           3.914.180.436           
Accrued Expenses 4.923.884.846           6.482.119.037           6.559.037.076           6.588.317.514           7.060.675.320           7.597.685.961           8.222.538.460           
Notes Payable/Short Term Debt 172.000.000                38.000.000                   -                                       -                                       -                                       -                                       -                                       
Customer Advances 661.130.904                739.905.895                682.233.359                732.176.150                789.353.106                856.174.399                931.947.723                
Income Taxes Payable 111.885.454                31.249.893                   -                                       -                                       -                                       -                                       -                                       
Other Current liabilities, Total 773.016.359          771.155.788          682.233.359          732.176.150          789.353.106          856.174.399          931.947.723          
Total Current Liabilities 7.755.470.316       9.587.929.494       9.724.599.861       10.122.287.730     10.944.292.601     11.969.883.224     13.068.666.619     
Long Term Debt 2.049.000.000           2.077.000.000           1.990.700.380           2.056.865.046           2.121.819.528           2.202.040.458           2.295.074.325           
Total Long Term Debt 2.049.000.000       2.077.000.000       1.990.700.380       2.056.865.046       2.121.819.528       2.202.040.458       2.295.074.325       
Total Debt 2.221.000.000       2.115.000.000       1.990.700.380       2.056.865.046       2.121.819.528       2.202.040.458       2.295.074.325       
Deferred Income Tax - LT Liability 556.127.088                926.465.286                684.606.706                741.537.817                772.963.977                778.744.500                816.180.081                
Deferred Income Tax 556.127.088          926.465.286          684.606.706          741.537.817          772.963.977          778.744.500          816.180.081          
Other Long Term Liabilities 1.196.000.000           1.457.931.591           1.967.711.123           1.976.495.254           2.118.202.596           2.279.305.788           2.466.761.538           
Other Liabilities, Total 1.196.000.000       1.457.931.591       1.967.711.123       1.976.495.254       2.118.202.596       2.279.305.788       2.466.761.538       
Total Liabilities 11.556.597.404     14.049.326.371     14.367.618.070     14.897.185.847     15.957.278.702     17.229.973.971     18.646.682.563     
Common Stock 14.994.051.949        16.179.038.778        17.509.029.832        19.184.950.923        20.290.007.458        21.691.343.188        23.375.763.496        
Common Stock 14.994.051.949     16.179.038.778     17.509.029.832     19.184.950.923     20.290.007.458     21.691.343.188     23.375.763.496     
Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) 27.343.340.131        34.147.031.440        34.147.031.440        34.147.031.440        34.147.031.440        34.147.031.440        34.147.031.440        
Other Comprehensive Income 522.964.204                487.273.932                333.000.000                333.000.000                333.000.000                333.000.000                333.000.000                
Other Equity, Total 522.964.204          487.273.932          333.000.000          333.000.000          333.000.000          333.000.000          333.000.000          
Total Equity 42.860.356.284     50.813.344.149     51.989.061.271     53.664.982.363     54.770.038.898     56.171.374.628     57.855.794.936     
Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity 54.416.953.688     64.862.670.520     66.356.679.342     68.562.168.210     70.727.317.599     73.401.348.599     76.502.477.499     
PredictionsActual Values
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